Presentations

The country’s security depends on its ability to anticipate crises

Crises are rarely sudden. They only seem so because it is only when a service breaks down or a river bursts its banks that they become apparent to everyone. They begin long before that, with subtle warning signs that nobody connects, known vulnerabilities that have never been addressed, and warnings that remain isolated.

by Erminio Polito

Aggiungi Il Sole 24 Ore
ai preferiti su Google

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

Crises are rarely sudden. They only seem so because it is only when a service is disrupted or a river bursts its banks that they become apparent to everyone. They begin much earlier, with faint warning signs that nobody connects, known vulnerabilities that are never addressed, and alerts that remain isolated. Such as an abnormal sensor reading, a weather report, an entry in maintenance logs, or a security alert dismissed as a false positive. Critical infrastructure today generates an unprecedented volume of data, but that data remains locked away within the systems of individual departments or different operators, and no one has an overall view of what is happening. So, when an emergency strikes, all attention is focused on the response. We count the resources deployed and the recovery times, we estimate the damage, and there is far less discussion of how the crisis came about.

For Italia, this issue is anything but abstract. Last year, Legambiente recorded 376 extreme weather events – the second-highest figure in the last eleven years. According to the Higher Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA), 94.5 per cent of local authorities are at risk of landslides, floods, coastal erosion or avalanches, whilst the Emilia-Romagna Region has estimated the damage caused by the 2023 floods alone at 8.5 billion euros. On the digital front, the picture is no better. According to the latest Clusit report, 9.6 per cent of serious cyber-attacks recorded worldwide targeted our country, representing a 42 per cent increase in one year.

Loading...

Then there is the hybrid threat, which the latest Annual Report on Security Information Policy identifies as one of the main challenges to national security. These are actions coordinated by states or by actors acting on their behalf, deliberately kept below the threshold of armed conflict in order to exploit the country’s vulnerabilities.

But let’s get back to the signals. Let’s imagine that, in the same week, there is a slowdown on a communications network, a minor disruption to the electricity supply and a case of overheating at a plant. Taken individually, these become separate tickets for the technical support team. Taken together, however, they may indicate an imminent component failure, a service disruption or even an attack disguised as a fault – precisely the sort of threat that intelligence agencies are concerned with.

Context also affects the meaning of a piece of data. A spike in traffic to a plant’s control systems is no cause for concern during a scheduled update. The same spike at three o’clock in the morning, with no maintenance work scheduled, is a different matter altogether.

Monitoring an infrastructure means knowing what has happened. Anticipating means recognising recurring patterns, understanding how one system depends on another, and estimating the consequences before they become apparent. It is a task that must be carried out continuously, because if analysis only begins when an alarm is triggered, it is usually already too late.

In recent years, operators and institutions have invested heavily in emergency response, with operations centres, civil protection plans, specialist teams and increasingly advanced monitoring systems. These are necessary investments. In such an interconnected network of services, however, reacting well and quickly is no longer enough. The advantage is gained earlier, when there is still time to prepare or to prevent the problem.

For a long time, an operator’s strength was measured by the robustness of their networks and the number of people and resources they could mobilise. Today, cognitive superiority is becoming increasingly important – that is, the ability to link events that appear to be unrelated and to understand their consequences before they occur.

The crises of the coming years will be increasingly hybrid and asymmetrical: they will intertwine natural, technological and deliberate causes, change in form and intensity as they unfold, and leave less and less time to understand them. No operations centre, however expert, can analyse thousands of such diverse signals in real time and identify the links between them. AI, on the other hand, can do just that, and it exponentially multiplies the capacity of those responsible for prevention and response. For this reason, it should not be regarded as merely one tool amongst many. When faced with events of this complexity, it is the very prerequisite for anticipating crises rather than reacting to them after the fact.

Solutions already exist: artificial intelligence platforms capable of integrating different sources, providing context for signals and supporting decision-making. When it comes to strategic infrastructure, however, two conditions must be met. The first is sovereignty, because the data must remain under the control of those who manage the service. The second is transparency. Every indication from the system must be capable of being explained and verified by those who will ultimately be held accountable for it.

Loading...

No one expects to eliminate uncertainty or achieve infallible forecasts. The aim is to spot problems earlier and give decision-makers more options to choose from. The decision remains in people’s hands. What changes is the quality of the information on which it is based, and the timing of that information.

Energy, water, transport, telecommunications and civil protection are now all part of a single system. An extreme weather event can damage infrastructure and connections and hamper the coordination of emergency response efforts. A cyberattack can have very real physical consequences, and an act of sabotage may be mistaken for a normal breakdown. To assess the resilience of an infrastructure, it is no longer enough to look at the condition of its facilities. We must ask ourselves who it depends on, to whom it provides services, and with whom it will need to coordinate when something goes wrong.

The strongest organisations will be those that are the first to recognise what is not yet obvious and to act in good time, putting AI at the service of decision-makers – not necessarily those with the greatest resources or the shortest recovery times.

I believe that, in the coming years, a significant part of the country’s security will hinge on this capability.

* CEO of the Indra Group in Italia

________________________________________

Copyright reserved ©
Loading...

Brand connect

Loading...

Newsletter

Notizie e approfondimenti sugli avvenimenti politici, economici e finanziari.

Iscriviti