China and Russia's alternative reading of history at the expense of the West
3' min read
3' min read
The 3 September military parade in Beijing, organised for the 80th anniversary of the victory against Japan, is part of the 'war of memory' initiated by Xi Jinping in 2015. The decision to commemorate the anniversary of the 'global war against fascism' helped to consolidate the narrative of the patriotic war as the founding historical precedent of the People's Republic of China, functional to legitimise Beijing's geopolitical ambitions, in particular its control over Taiwan. Indeed, the anniversary also evokes the return of Taiwan to China after half a century of Japanese occupation.
It should be remembered that the myth of the 'great patriotic war' is also promoted by Vladimir Putin, who used it to legitimise the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the current conflict with Ukraine.
In this way, China and Russia propose an alternative reading of history, as opposed to the Western narrative of the Allied victory, which is more centred on the decisive role of the United States and Western Europe.
These efforts to 'downplay' the Western narrative pursue three main objectives. First, they aim to show that China and the USSR contributed far more than is commonly acknowledged to the defeat of fascism. Secondly, they aim to draw attention to the post-World War I allied agreements negotiated in Cairo and Potsdam, which in their view provide not only a legal, but also a moral basis for their current territorial and strategic interests. Finally, they promote the idea of preserving the post-war international order, as opposed to the Western commitment to defend a liberal international order.
Russia, in particular, exploits an amplified interpretation of the Soviet role in the defeat of fascism to support its claim to have a say in the expansion of NATO and the European Union.
