He demands the return of the gifts for the shattered wedding but was married and pays moral damages
He demanded his ex to return the gifts he had given her in preparation for her wedding, but he was already married and must pay the woman 14,000 euros in moral damages
He had taken his ex-girlfriend to the courts to askfor the return of the gifts that she had given him on the occasion of an unfulfilledwedding promise. Too bad the promise had not been kept, because he was married and had not, at the time, obtained a divorce. The Supreme Court sided with the woman, as had the court - to which the man had appealed to have the gifts returned - and the Court of Appeal.
In the first instance, the judges had rejected the request for restitution and accepted the woman's request for compensation. For the judges, it was not disputed that the two had had an affair. But it was equally proven that he was married at the time when he bestowed gifts as a pledge of love. Including a wedding ring and a "wedding-like" ceremony on the beach celebrated, however, without first asking for a separation from his lawful wife.
The mock ceremony on the beach and the wedding ring
The Supreme Court endorses the conclusions reached by the trial judges. There was no evidence that the gifts were made because of the promise of marriage. They were rathergifts of use, as well as a refund of thetravel expenses that the lady had incurred in order to spend weekends with the plaintiff, as well as to accommodate her son, even giving up work shifts. Gifts on the occasion of anniversaries and refunds thus lacking "the causal connection with the promise of marriage that did not take place".
The repentant suitor had not proved the existence of a serious promise of marriage: "The exchange of rings -such as a wedding ring- and the alleged ceremony on the beach were irrelevant, the only proof of which was the "hearsay", i.e. a village rumour that certainly could not be assimilated to a notorious fact," reads the sentence, "since these were circumstances that did not assume the value of indicative elements of a serious intention to marry, since they had to be read together with the other elements characterising the relationship between the parties.
A "vagueness of the project of common life also emerged from the plaintiff's narration, who had not even indicated what the future location of the common life would be, as well as from the testimony of the other witnesses, who had qualified the relationship between the two at most asextramarital".


