Copied balance sheets, forged deeds and ad hoc companies: Covid aid fraud spies

The verification system also intercepts abnormal links. As mentioned, companies were identified that were disconnected from each other, but shared the same Ip (Internet protocol address): the different applications for funds were sent with the same code identifying the sending device (e.g. a PC).

It is not enough, however, to check who is asking. It is also necessary to check how the money is spent. And here history repeats itself.E-commerce built under false pretences, but with public funds. Overbilled expenses, suppliers - always the same - sometimes foreign, sometimes traceable to the same group that asked for the public money intended for SMEs. The system becomes more complicated in Covid financing. With the Liquidity Decree, many banks issued loans without checking creditworthiness. The money arrived, and the companies disappeared. Or worse: they used those funds to close down.

The principle also applies toenergy incentives. Where photovoltaic installations are artificially split up in order not to exceed the thresholds. Or where Esco (Energy service companies) declare savings that were never obtained with false documents. In Turin, a 30 million-plus fraud started this way. And then there is thebioenergy sector, where the ecomafias come into the picture. Biomass that is not biomass. Waste that ends up in plants. Certifications bought. And incentives cashed in. To look at it from the outside, the scam seems impermeable. Looking at it from the inside, it leaves a signature.

Pnrr, inflated contributions

In the area of financinglinked to the Pnrr - in particular the refinancing of the fund managed by Simest - control activities revealed numerous irregularities. The fund, aimed at promoting the digital and ecological transition of SMEs and internationalisation, has been at the centre of frauds based on forged accounts: overestimated expenses, participation in fairs that never took place or even non-existent events, and operating headquarters declared in the south of Italy only to access higher contributions.

SME Fund

During the pandemic crisis, regulatory changes made to the guarantee fundfor small and medium-sized enterprises generated new opportunities for fraud. Automated procedures and the waiving of creditworthiness have made it possible to access public funding even without the requirements.

In several cases, lending institutions omitted the economic-financial assessment of the applicant. Once the loan was obtained, the companies went into default and repayment fell back on the public guarantee.

GSE and incentives

In the field ofrenewable energies and energy efficiency, fraud is concentrated on two fronts:

1) the elusive splitting of facilities;

2) the false attestations of the Esco (Energy Service Company).

The first consists in artificially dividing a single plant (photovoltaic, wind) into several smaller units, so as to accesshigher incentives, avoid guarantees or more complex procedures. The Esco, on the other hand, produced false certificates for interventions that were never or only partially carried out.

Bioenergy

The sector of bioenergy production has been highly exposed to fraudulent phenomena. The frauds range from the use of non-compliant biomass - or substituted by real waste - to the falsification of environmental traceability certification, often with the complicity of the certifying bodies themselves. Interministerial Decree 294/2024 introduced a new national sustainability certification system, which is compulsory to access incentives. But systematic circumvention practices have emerged in several cases.