Digital Economy

Breaking the Internet, that fatal temptation that conquers governments

The alarm emerged from a debate among the European internet governance elite during Nam 2024 in June

14 June 2024

5' min read

There is a temptation that is conquering more and more countries. And not only totalitarian ones. To manipulate the digital infrastructure at the base of the great Internet, for security or geopolitical reasons. But this move, even when animated by apparent good motives (to protect legitimate interests), is always dangerous. A fatal temptation. The alarm and also some possible solutions to the dilemma - how to protect internet users without breaking the toy - emerged from a debate among the elite of European internet governance, during Nam 2024 in June (organised by the non-profit Namex consortium, a neutral point of interconnection between networks in Italy).

"When we started out, if we talked about the internet, we were told two things: it's 'what is the internet' or how good the internet is. Now more and more politicians, governments are saying that the internet can be a bad idea and they want to block it somehow," says Andrew Sullivan, of the Internet Society, the famous global charity for the beneficial development of the internet. "That's why it's increasingly important to defend the internet."

The blocks

In 2024, according to a monitoring by the Internet Society, there have so far (at the beginning of June) been 38 voluntary Internet blockades, wanted by governments. The main country to do so is not Russia, nor even China, but the world's largest democracy (by population): India. According to data compiled by Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition, India led this unflattering ranking in 2023, with 116 shutdowns, with an increasing trend towards regional versus localised shutdowns, particularly in Manipur and Punjab.

It is worrying, the experts note, that this temptation conquers democracies. The reasons why they make these blockades are varied and not always motivated to suppress a protest (as happened in Iran). "Sometimes they say they do it to protect an election from misinformation or a public contest from fraud. In many of these cases, governments make a mistake in good faith, but damage their own country and the global network in the process,' Sullivan explains.

Governments - national or regional - ask operators to block Internet access. Sometimes, however, they turn to the global institutions of internet governance to centrally block certain content or connections. And even in this case, the motives may seem humanly supportable. In 2022, Ukraine asked two bodies, Icann and Ripe Ncc, to take action against Russia. Ripe is an Internet registry responsible for the allocation of addresses. Icann is a non-profit, multistakeholder organisation responsible for the security of certain vital Internet operations.

Ukraine asked Icann to revoke the rights of Russian geographical top-level domains (the .RU, .SU and .рф domain names) and to close the root servers in Russia. They also asked Ripe Ncc to revoke Russian members' rights to IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.

At the same time, some Western countries issued sanctions against Russia that had the effect of disconnecting parts of the internet infrastructure from Russian networks. However, Icann and Ripe rejected the Ukrainian request that would have completely disconnected Russia from the global internet.

Why tampering with the Internet is always a bad idea

"When we received the Ukrainian request, Russian bombs were killing civilians. I can fully understand the position of Ukraine, which wanted to protect itself from online disinformation and Russian cyber attacks in this way,' says Hans Petter Hollen, European head of Ripe. But it would still have been a bad idea: 'our registry serves to identify entities on the network. If we used it as a weapon for international sanctions, we would no longer know who does what,' he explains. To the detriment of the internet and also of the need for international authorities to identify malicious actors. "We too received the letter, it was a moment, but our governance remains multistakeholder made up of governments, technicians, companies," explains Chris Mondini, European head of Icann. "If only one government has the power to achieve this, the whole system breaks down, trust in the internet by citizens, companies, states falls," he adds.

Therefore, no to the internet as a geopolitical weapon means condemning it to death. It is in its neutrality that it finds its meaning. What is more, it means compromising the value of the net just when people need it most, to find accurate information and access means of security, according to the Internet Society. "We cannot allow the Internet to become a pawn in geopolitics. Politicising decisions on the inner workings of the Internet sets a dangerous precedent that puts us on the path to a 'splinternet' - an artificially divided Internet along political, economic and technological boundaries. The effects could be irreversible, opening the door to further restrictions worldwide,' writes the Internet Society in a public manifesto.

"We call on governments, companies and organisations around the world to ensure that the day-to-day technical governance of the Internet is not politicised. It is critical that the management and operations of the Internet infrastructure, including naming, addressing, routing and security systems, remain apolitical. Sanctions should not disrupt access to and use of the Internet. Where necessary, sanctions regimes should offer exemptions to ensure continuity of service of the Internet infrastructure'.

What can you do?

Something can still be done, however. In a 2022 report signed by several experts (among others, from Icann, Ripe, MEPs, academics), Multistakeholder Imposition of Internet Sanctions says that one cannot disconnect a population from the internet, but there can be focused and precise sanctions against malicious actors and content. Europe has blocked the Kremlin's propaganda media tools. Blacklists of entities (IP addresses, domains, traffic) can be made, as long as it is a temporary and revocable decision; and as long as the multistakeholder community behind internet governance reaches a consensus on it. This measure 'once decided, is easily invoked and just as easily revoked once the problem is solved. Above all, it entails no significant costs or risks and is in line with the values and principles of multistakeholder Internet governance,' the report states.

Even national authorities can act against the risk of disinformation proliferating on social and the web. In our country, the Communications Authority (Agcom) does this, with a round table open to all stakeholders (operators, publishers, social...). Even this measure must be concerted with everyone - as is the nature of the web - and weighed carefully. "Beware, the mistake would be to ask for the censorship of content that is not disinformation but is an opinion unwelcome to a certain government or majority," Agcom's Davide Gallino told Nam 2024.