Chinese underground banks: eight arrests and 31 million seized. Over 200 million laundered
The “Green River” investigation by the Lodi Public Prosecutor’s Office: according to the Guardia di Finanza, a network of 41 shell companies is alleged to have generated false invoices and transferred money to China via underground banking channels
Key points
- The 41 paper companies and the 10% commission
A network of false invoices, shell companies and money transfers to China totalling over €200 million. This is the picture at the heart of the “Green River” investigation, coordinated by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Lodi and carried out by the Economic and Financial Police Unit of the Lodi Financial Police. The order concerns personal precautionary measures against eight individuals, who are alleged, according to the prosecution’s case, to be members of a criminal organisation engaged in self-laundering and the issuance and use of invoices for non-existent transactions. Real precautionary measures have also been ordered against 44 individuals, amounting to a total of approximately €31 million.
The investigation began in 2024 following a tax audit of a company based in the Lodi area, which later turned out to be a shell company. According to investigators, the company operated as a paper mill and issued invoices for non-existent transactions worth thousands of euros. That initial investigation revealed a wider criminal organisation capable of exploiting the money-laundering mechanisms of ‘underground banking’ – that is, systems for transferring money outside official and regulated financial channels, circumventing anti-money-laundering safeguards.
According to the prosecution, over €200 million is transferred to China via this scheme, often channelled through European countries. Investigators have reconstructed the mechanism, which allows the beneficiaries of the false invoices to launder the proceeds of various types of predicate offences: tax offences, corporate offences, bankruptcy offences, but also offences linked to drugs and organised crime.
At the same time, the system enables the Chinese community to launder large sums of money derived from its economic activities and to repatriate the ‘cleaned’ funds to China. This is achieved through a two-way process: on the one hand, cash is returned to the recipients of the false invoices; on the other, these recipients make bank transfers to current accounts managed by the association.
In many transactions, money is transferred via so-called virtual IBANs – codes that redirect funds to a single main account. According to investigators, this system makes it possible to conceal the true beneficiaries and makes it extremely difficult to trace the flow of funds involved in the fraudulent invoicing.

