European policies

Common defence debt: risks and limits of a premature initiative

Shared debt issuance without a consolidated fiscal and political union risks generating liabilities without accountability

by Umberto Bertonelli, Michele Boldrin, Nazareno Lecis

3' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

3' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

The debate on issuing new common European debt, specifically to finance the strengthening of common defence, has been reopened. The argument in favour of this initiative is that we must extend the Ngeu experience to other large industrial and technological projects. The proposal is presented as a natural factor for integration. In reality, now, it is a bad idea. Not because of ideology, but because of institutional and political shortcomings as well as its economic consequences.

The EU does not have an autonomous fiscal capacity. The European budget is worth about 1% of the Union's GDP and is financed by national contributions. The parliament has no power of taxation. It cannot decide autonomously on either revenues or expenditures with a relevant macroeconomic dimension. Issuing debt without a corresponding fiscal authority accountable to the voters means creating future liabilities without explicit political responsibility.

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In 2020, the exception was justified by the pandemic and took shape in the Ngeu programme, of which the Italia NRP is a part. Today, it is proposed to turn that exception into a rule, expanding its scope and ambitions. But the evaluation of the results should precede the replication of the instrument. There are many reasons to doubt that the whole thing has been a success, at least in economic terms.

Data on the implementation, as documented by the European Court of Auditors, of national NRPs show delays, reallocations of expenditure, revisions of objectives and widespread administrative difficulties. In Italia the impact on productivity is, to date, certainly lower than initially expected and probably not positive. In other countries, resource absorption is proceeding with similar slowness and evident lack of positive effects. All available evidence says that Ngeu has been the opposite of a success.

Second node: defence. There is talk of a 'European army', but there is no common military policy approved in a binding way by all states. Foreign and security policy decisions remain largely intergovernmental. The Commission has no mandate to define a common military doctrine, whose competence remains with the individual states. We would then have to issue debt to finance a project that does not yet exist!

Debt-financing an army implies at least three conditions: a unified chain of command, a shared definition of strategic threats, and clear political accountability to the electorate. Today, none of these conditions are fully met. What would be financed, concretely? Standardisation of armaments? Research and development? Current expenditure on personnel? Without a federal defence structure, the risk is to finance a sum of heterogeneous national expenditures, with benefits distributed asymmetrically.

Third node: fiscal heterogeneity. Debt-to-GDP ratios in the euro area vary markedly. In a monetary union without full fiscal union, common debt introduces an obvious moral hazard problem. Why should taxpayers in the so-called 'frugal' countries agree to further mutualise the risk associated with spending policies they do not control?

The issue is not one of morality but of incentives. If the ultimate responsibility for repayment is collective, but spending decisions remain partly national or otherwise fragmented, the resulting balance tends to generate more debt than would be chosen in a context of full fiscal responsibility. The experience of the NRP should have taught us that the proceeds of common debt have been spent according to national political expediency with at least questionable results on overall growth.

Finally, the macroeconomic environment. Real interest rates, while down from their 2023-24 peaks, are no longer at the historic lows of the previous decade. Issuing new common debt would take place in an environment of increased competition for global savings and with a European Central Bank committed to maintaining price stability. The idea that European debt would pay lower real rates than US federal debt, acting as a 'weapon' against Trumpian aggression, is simply laughable.

The stability of the euro depends on the overall credibility of the area. To introduce permanent common debt instruments without having completed the banking union, without a federal budget and without a democratic fiscal responsibility mechanism is to put the cart before the horse. First build the institutions; then share the liabilities.

The argument that 'the US does it' overlooks a decisive detail: the US is a federation with a Congress that imposes federal taxes, a Treasury accountable to the voters, and a Supreme Court that arbitrates conflicts of competence. The EU does not.

If true political integration is the goal, the transfer of fiscal sovereignty to the European level through a democratically endorsed procedure should be put on the table. In the absence of this step, the issuance of new common debt is a cop-out: it creates common bonds without creating a common fiscal demos shared by the citizenry.

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