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Europe-Gulf cooperation and the storm of war

(Reuters) REUTERS

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

The new Gulf War breaks out in the year that could sanction a turning point, also a multilateral one, in the cooperation between Europe and the six monarchies in the area. In fact, the first Europe-Gulf Forum, which will bring together institutions and businesses, is scheduled to take place in Greece in May; above all, Saudi Arabia will host the second European Union-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) institutional summit in the autumn.

For the Europeans, the road to the Gulf was downhill. Not least because the economy was at the heart of cooperation. Compounded by international instability, the European countries and monarchies in the region became, from crisis to crisis, more and more assiduous partners: first the European search for gas and oil after the Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022), then the Gulf's role as mediator in the Middle East wars (Gaza from 2023; Israel-Iran in 2025), finally Trump's tariffs to push European companies, too, into the region's markets (2025).

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However, Israel and the United States' war on Iran, and Tehran's reaction against the monarchies in the area, have changed the framework and expectations for the Gulf. Making the choices for European institutions and countries more difficult. In fact, the economy will no longer be the absolute protagonist of the partnership: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman will want to widen the perimeter of cooperation to security and defence, with two objectives: to strengthen national anti-missile and anti-drone systems, and to find partners to contribute -after the ceasefire- to the safety of commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

For Brussels and European capitals, it would have been much easier to discuss only free trade agreements and investments in advanced technologies with kings, emirs and sultans. But this war, which affects the traditional economy (energy) and the new economy of connectivity (airports, ports, data centres, tourism), has already changed the way the Gulf Arab governments look at the world. And to their future.

With the Europeans having to figure out, on a bilateral and multilateral level, how to balance interests and realities: because the stability of the Gulf is now a strategic European interest but, at the same time, our capacity for political influence in the quadrant is very limited. And what is more, European rearmament - or rather the rearmament of individual European states - has only just begun.

Iran has so far launched thousands of drones and ballistic missiles against the territories of the monarchies, whose air defences, mainly American-supplied, are effectively intercepting most of the threats: however, the fragments cannot be eliminated and they do damage, sometimes injuring and killing. The point is that the attacks have been going on for almost a month now: to defend themselves, these countries use expensive systems such as the Patriot and, only Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence).

The monarchies must therefore find more efficient and sustainable defence alternatives in proportion to the low cost of the Iranian-launched drones. And stock up, for today and, who knows, for tomorrow. This is why the Gulf Arab capitals have welcomed teams of Ukrainian experts and have requested defence systems from some European countries, including Italia.

Then there is the Hormuz knot. Among the more than twenty countries that have written that they are "ready to contribute to the appropriate efforts" to secure navigation in the Strait are many European states, as well as the Arab Emirates and Bahrain.

Any maritime initiative will, however, have to follow the ceasefire - at the moment still a mirage - as well as the approval of a UN resolution on which Manama (non-permanent member of the Security Council for 2026-27) is now working. It is precisely maritime security that is at the heart of the talks that the EU and the GCC started in 2024, culminating in the first summit that year in Brussels, along with infrastructure security, cybersecurity and counter-terrorism.

On the economic level, the path of cooperation had already been mapped out. Last December, the European Union started negotiations on strategic partnership agreements with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (soon also with Saudi Arabia), focusing on energy, infrastructure, digitalisation, AI and technology. And for the creation of a free trade area with the UAE.

The most ambitious goal, however, is the free trade zone between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council: a project that has been at a standstill for decades, not least because of disagreements in the mutual 'blocs'. Although they have very different levels of integration, structures and mechanisms, the EU and GCC have similar difficulties in deciding internally, in the case of the Gulf, mistrust and rivalry. The latest example is the geopolitical disagreement between Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates (especially in Yemen, Sudan and Somalia), only frozen by the outbreak of war.

In the pivotal year for Europe-Gulf cooperation, the conflict is now a test case for this partnership in the making, especially at the multilateral level. Until now, looking at the monarchies in the area, Brussels and European capitals had thought of defence in relation to investments and joint ventures. The Gulf countries under attack now demand, also from us, concrete choices and commitments in the security and defence sector, in the wake of the emergency. The road to cooperation is marked out, but now it is a bit more uphill.

(*) ISPI Senior Research Associate, Aseri Lecturer

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