Corruption as a Security Threat: Intelligence Services in Europe

Perception is not a secondary element. As numerous scholars point out, it has concrete effects: it influences political stability, the international reputation of countries, the cost of public debt and investment decisions. In other words, even when judicial data do not indicate an explosion of cases, corruption can still become a strategic vulnerability factor.

Spain is an emblematic case of this dynamic. The main international indicators point to a recent worsening in the perception of corruption, although the number of major scandals remains limited compared to other contexts. Political scientist Víctor Lapuente speaks openly of a 'Spanish paradox': corruption is not widespread, but when it does emerge, it does so in highly visible and systemic forms, involving extensive networks of officials, politicians and intermediaries.

This visibility amplifies the impact on public opinion and fuels the idea of a culture of impunity. Yet, Spain is one of the countries that has chosen to keep the intelligence services completely out of the fight against corruption. Investigations remain the prerogative of the judiciary and the police, while the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia is rigidly confined to the sphere of external security and strategic threats.

The European comparison shows a clear split between models. On the one hand, countries such as Austria, Spain and the Czech Republic maintain a formal and substantial separation between intelligence and anti-corruption. In Austria, although there is a national anti-corruption strategy and increasing political attention to the phenomenon, investigations are entrusted to a specialised agency, the Bundesamt für Korruptionsbekämpfung, while the internal security service deals exclusively with terrorism, extremism and espionage.

In the Czech Republic, the domestic intelligence service (BIS) may incidentally come across corruption incidents, especially when links to foreign powers emerge. However, the transmission of information to the judicial authorities often takes place only after the intelligence activities have been completed, with delays that have already led to criticism about the real effectiveness of the system. On the other hand, countries such as Greece, Bulgaria and Romania show greater permeability between national security and the fight against corruption, albeit with very different outcomes.

In Greece, the fight against corruption is governed by a national strategy coordinated by the National Authority for Transparency. Formally, the EYP does not have a direct anti-corruption mandate. However, when corruption phenomena are intertwined with organised crime or threats to state security, cooperation between EYP, the judiciary and the police becomes possible.

This already fragile set-up was profoundly shaken by the illegal wiretapping scandal and the use of Predator software that emerged between 2021 and 2024. The case showed how the expansion of surveillance capabilities, in the absence of stringent controls and transparency, can turn into an instrument of political pressure and undermine trust in democratic institutions.

The Bulgarian case is perhaps the most radical example of the risks associated with a securitarian approach. Over the past two decades, under pressure from the European Union, the country has repeatedly created and reformed anti-corruption structures with extraordinary powers. The current Commission for Combating Corruption concentrates investigative functions, arrest capabilities and interception tools, operating in a framework of almost total opacity. Created to compensate for the ineffectiveness of the prosecution, the Commission has progressively become an autonomous power centre, accused of selectivity and political use of investigations. According to numerous observers and former institutional leaders, the problem lies not so much in the lack of instruments as in the absence of a system of guarantees and a truly independent judiciary.

Romania today stands at a crossroads. Including corruption in the National Defence Strategy means recognising its systemic character and destabilising potential. But it also means opening the door to an involvement of the intelligence services that, without clear boundaries, risks reproducing the same critical issues observed elsewhere.

Public policy experts agree on one point: intelligence can only play a role in the fight against corruption in exceptional cases, when strategic interests, foreign infiltration or direct threats to the state are at stake. In these cases, however, its intervention must be strictly circumscribed, subject to effective parliamentary and judicial controls and separated from the criminal repressive phase.

The European experience suggests that turning corruption into a national security issue is a high-risk option. It can strengthen the state's ability to detect opaque networks and illicit financial flows, but it can also erode democratic guarantees and fuel new forms of abuse.

*This article is part of the European collaborative journalism project "Pulse"