Aerostat conflict

From the Chinese case to the tests in the Middle East: the spy balloon war has begun

In 2023, a Beijing-built device was shot down in the stratosphere by the US after it had flown over nuclear bases. Following this, the US military launched a series of tests with the aim of creating a fleet of 300 units, combined with drones carried by air currents. This new high-altitude competition is putting military balances, airspace sovereignty and the security of European industries to the test

by 24Ore NextMed

28 October 2026

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Foto a pallone aerostatico cinese scattata da un pilota di un U-2 dell’aeronautica militare statunitense in una località degli Stati Uniti centrali Wikipedia

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Key points

The airspace rule
Drones carried by air currents and US tests
Research in the Middle East
The European constraint

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Translated by AI

Versione italiana

Two hundred or three hundred balloons in the stratosphere at the same time. This is the ambition expressed by General Steven Carpenter, commander of the US Army’s Multi-Domain Command–Europe. And, whatever the outcome, it is the litmus test of an ongoing transformation. Military, financial and diplomatic: the clearest illustration of the political issue dates back to February 2023. A Chinese balloon, which the US Department of Defence described as a surveillance platform, crossed North America at an altitude of around 60,000 feet. Washington ordered its shoot-down on 4 February; Beijing described it as a civilian meteorological aircraft that had strayed off course. The dispute disrupted a high-level diplomatic engagement: Secretary of State Antony Blinken postponed his planned visit to China.

Airspace regulations

The legal principle remains that set out in Article 1 of the 1944 Chicago Convention: every State exercises complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its own territory. Altitude does not constitute authorisation to overfly, and dependence on wind conditions does not absolve the operator of responsibility. An incident at high altitude therefore requires coordination between technical observation, attribution, civil aviation, military authorities and diplomacy: five stages that do not usually proceed at the same pace.

Drones carried by air currents and US tests

In May 2026, images and reports circulated regarding tests of the Hornet drone, described as being controlled by artificial intelligence, carried by a balloon and released after completing part of its journey by utilising air currents; Subsequently, images of larger, twin-engine aircraft appeared. The atmospheric carrier can spare the drone part of the flight that would otherwise require its own propulsion.

In the United States, experimental activities have a fairly broad institutional base. In June 2024, during the Valiant Shield exercise in the area of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, the Multi-Domain Task Force deployed balloons at altitudes exceeding 50,000 feet, equipped with electromagnetic sensors and communications equipment. On 9 May 2026, Multi-Domain Command–Europe conducted trials in Sweden at altitudes between 60,000 and 70,000 feet, with flights lasting approximately twelve hours; in the subsequent exercise, Cold Raptor, launch and control operations from separate locations were tested in Poland.

Clinical trials in the Middle East

Andrew Evans, Head of Strategy and Transformation for Military Intelligence in the US Army, has stated on several occasions that – in support of Central Command in the Middle East – launches involving groups of twenty-four units have also been successfully carried out. If this is indeed the case, Carpenter’s plan to deploy 200–300 balloons simultaneously (designed to deceive defences, relay communications, gather intelligence, carry out electronic attacks or deploy drones) appears to be a realistic objective.

The Defence Budget

The cost of an aerostat does not equate to that of a mission: sensors, equipment, personnel, wastage, flight management and any recovery operations must all be taken into account. On the other hand, the cost of an interceptor alone does not measure defensive effectiveness: destroying a suspicious object can prevent industrial damage far exceeding the expenditure incurred, whilst ignoring a correctly identified decoy may be the most rational choice. This is why the NATO policy on integrated air and missile defence, approved on 13 February 2025, emphasises continuous surveillance, interoperable command, passive protection and infrastructure resilience.

The bill comes as the Allies adopted, at The Hague on 25 June 2025, the target of 5 per cent of annual GDP for defence and security spending by 2035: at least 3.5 per cent for essential military requirements and up to 1.5 per cent for eligible security-related expenditure. The European Union, through Readiness 2030, forecasts up to €800 billion in potential additional expenditure by 2030. With regard to this specific issue, the financial interest lies in choosing between sensors and command systems capable of detecting a wide range of threats and specialised procurements, as opposed to a capability that could remain intermittent.

The European constraint

Within the European Union, there is an institutional framework. NATO coordinates collective defence; governments retain authority over their own operations and airspace; Brussels can support industry, investment and the continuity of essential services. Directive 2022/2557 stipulates that, for qualifying incidents, an initial report must be submitted within 24 hours and recognises the particular importance of entities providing essential services in at least six Member States. These rules should serve to reduce the risk that a local event goes without a comprehensive assessment. If balloon tests continue, military command structures will have to demonstrate whether they can distinguish dangerous targets from decoys without misallocating limited resources; the authorities responsible for procurement will have to demand results before funding major investments. This, even before control of the stratosphere, is the tangible cost of the new atmospheric competition.