Differentiated autonomy: a new regionalism that will increase efficiency and reduce territorial disparities

2. Prejudiciality in the implementation of differentiated autonomy. The bias (first the implementation of fiscal federalism and then differentiated autonomy) has no reason to exist either from a constitutional or a financial point of view.

Article 116(3) of the Constitution, in fact, requires for the implementation of differentiated autonomy compliance with the 'principles' of another constitutional provision, that (Article 119) on fiscal federalism, and does not set an order of priority. The implementing law does not jeopardise these principles in any way, but guarantees the financial balance between the allocation of functions and regional revenues as well as financial neutrality for the regions that do not wish to accede to differentiated autonomy.

From a financial point of view, it is hard to see how the increase in the regional co-participation in state taxes, to an extent corresponding to the functions transferred to the Region and hitherto performed by the state administration, could jeopardise equalisation or prevent its further implementation under the terms of Law 42 of 2009 or the tax delegation itself.

3. The Lep. There is no doubt that one of the merits of Implementation Law No. 86 of 2024 is that of having initiated (after the first provisions of the Budget Law for 2023) an organic determination of the LEP with the full involvement of the Chambers. The LEPs (essential levels of services concerning civil and social rights that must be guaranteed throughout the national territory) are an equalisation instrument par excellence. Some services (those deemed 'essential' by the legislator, precisely!), more than others, cannot be differentiated, since they are to safeguard the common rights of citizenship. The law implementing differentiated autonomy has identified the subjects and subject areas to which the LEPs refer. We are working to exercise the delegation on Lep. According to the law, the LEPs do not constitute - as Prof. Gallo claims - mere long-term objectives but must be built around performance. Standard costs and requirements will have to be matched to them, it is inevitable, because the right to certain services cannot turn into a pretext for local authorities or the state to support unlimited spending. Budget balances and, in broader terms, the rights of future generations that would have to bear the possible debt incurred to sustain that unlimited expenditure would be at stake.

The determination of standard costs and requirements means - moreover - that the thesis that Leps necessarily increase expenditure is devoid of scientific foundation. There may be Leps whose standard requirements prove to be lower than historical expenditure and Leps in which, on the contrary, historical expenditure may prove to be lower than the standard.

There is therefore no reason to have to wait for the determination of all Lep (including those in matters not affected by differentiated autonomy) in order to proceed with the implementation of Article 116(3). All the more so for matters or areas of matters that the legislature has already determined cannot be referred to Lep.

The legislator did not merely promise the LEPs - as Prof. Gallo claims - but defined for the first time in an organic manner the procedure and the areas for their determination. The determination of the financing instruments (as stated: where necessary) can only be subsequent to the relevant standard costs and requirements.

4. The role of Parliament. Nor is there any reason to lament the role - according to Prof. Gallo: subordinate - of Parliament. It is Parliament that has introduced a delegation provision on the determination of the Lep. The Chambers will be involved in the process of exercising the delegation, with the possibility of influencing the contents - sometimes particularly technical - of the texts prepared by the government.

Nor can I agree with the argument that the Chambers have an exclusively formal role on the content of the understandings. Article 2 of the implementing law introduced a specific phase of parliamentary intervention from the first phase of the negotiation, on outline agreements. The Government would be obliged to follow up on the guidelines approved by Parliament. The same Parliament that will then, by express constitutional provision, be called upon to deliberate on the understanding, by absolute majority.

5. Accountability. On the relationship between regional spending power and the accountability of administrators, Prof. Gallo failed to mention that the implementation law provides the government with powerful tools for monitoring both the actual implementation of Lep (art. 3, paragraph 4) and the implementation of agreements (art. 8).

Two final considerations. No mention is made by Professor Gallo of the content of Article 10 of the law, concerning the so-called infrastructural equalisation: the equalisation and promotion measures for economic development, cohesion and social solidarity, which constitutes another piece of the guarantee measures for all territorial realities, whether or not they participate in the agreements.

Moreover, I would like to recall that Professor Gallo had at the time accepted my proposal to be part of the experts (from which he is now demanding answers), in particular with reference to the Committee on Essential Levels of Performance (Clep), chaired by Professor Cassese. The Committee had accepted Professor Gallo's proposal to extend the area of the Committee's preliminary investigation also to Lep referring to subjects other than those of differentiated autonomy. It is a pity that, despite this, the professor decided, together with other authoritative members of the Committee, to resign, thus renouncing the opportunity to make a constructive contribution to a complex process that is so important for the entire country and not just for one political party.

Ultimately: parliamentary involvement, guarantee of rights, financial balance, reduction of existing inequalities. It is hard to see how inequalities, which are the result of a centralisation model that has had its day.