Don't use the bag to be a notary: the Hermès case
by Bernardo Bertoldi *
In a recent familyandtrends he argued that the ownership of a company influences its strategy by analysing the Hermès case and, incidentally, also argued that listing to liquidate some family members is a mistake. This should be an argument of minor interest and for a small number of Italian entrepreneurs and business families, yet it seems to have aroused interest, and some contestation, among readers. Let us see why it is a mistake.
The listing offers low-cost capital for companies that need to grow organically and the possibility of mergers with share exchange for those that need to grow by acquisition. It is low cost because for listed companies the risk premium is around 4/6%, the lower of the costs for venture capital. Moreover, on the stock exchange if you do well the value of the company grows and you can make capital increases by putting smaller shares on the market for the same amount of capital: this further lowers the cost of capital.
Private equity costs more, i.e. 20/25% risk premium, and disburses the capital in one or a few solutions. Both cases, stock exchange or private equity, are suboptimal ways to liquidate family members: to clarify this, let us return to the Hermès case.
Hermès went public in 1993, placing 425,000 shares at a price of $55 to 4,000 shareholders, who were lucky because the demand for shares was 34 times higher (a sign that the price was too low). A hypothetical family member who wanted to sell and had reinvested, say, 1 million in the French stock exchange index, a domestic diversification choice, would today have 4.4 million (+336.7%); if he had invested in the MCSI world, a global diversification choice, he would today have 10.5 million (+950.5%).
If he had not sold today he would have 254.4 million (+25,325.7%). Of course he could not have known it would do so well, and certainly diversifying the risk and having the advantage of liquidity would have been a legitimate choice.


