EU working to overcome the unanimity requirement in foreign policy

In the 1990s, when with Maastricht (1992) the Common Foreign and Security Policy was born and with Amsterdam (1999) the first coordination mechanisms were introduced, that culture of unanimity entered the DNA of the CFSP, marking its intergovernmental architecture. In between, in 1994, the Joannina compromise attempted to balance majority and minority: if a sufficiently large group of states did not reach the 'blocking minority' but was nevertheless substantial, it could ask to reopen the discussion and delay the adoption of the decision. A compromise formula that turned the search for agreement into a permanent negotiating exercise, so much so that it was even taken up in a declaration annexed to the Lisbon Treaty. The result was a kind of stratification because every time an attempt was made to limit unanimity, a new valve was introduced that, in fact, kept it alive.

The present, however, pushes. With the probable enlargements towards Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and the Western Balkans, a Union of thirty or thirty-five members could no longer function with the same rules. Each new entry would mean multiplying possible vetoes and lengthening decision-making times already considered unsustainable today. Already in 2018, the Juncker Commission, in its communication A stronger global actor: a more efficient decision-making for EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, warned against the risk of paralysis and proposed to use the passerelle in three pilot areas: sanctions, human rights and civilian missions. In 2023, the European Parliament's Research Service published a study calculating the economic and political benefits of overcoming unanimity, speaking explicitly of the 'cost of non-Europe' in foreign policy: delays that weaken international credibility, delays that generate economic losses, divisions that become breeding grounds for rival powers. If in a Union of 27 unanimity is already difficult, in a Union of 35 it risks turning into a self-sabotage mechanism.

Qualified majority voting is already the norm in many other areas, where 55% of the member states representing at least 65% of the population, or 72% of the states if the proposal does not come from the Commission or the High Representative, are needed to approve a decision. From the internal market to environmental policies, from agriculture to competition, the so-called 'double majority' has made decisions involving often diverging interests faster and more transparent. Applying it to CFSP would mean transforming intergovernmental cooperation into a system more akin to a federal posture. That is why the treaty has drawn precise boundaries: military and defence dossiers remain armoured by unanimity, as does every choice that could affect the ultimate sovereignty of states. The idea is therefore not to centralise everything in Brussels, but to prevent a single government from blocking the entire Union on declarations, sanctions or civil missions, areas where speed is often more important than the perfection of consensus.

Recent events reinforce the urgency. Last July, the 18th sanctions package against Russia reached the finishing line only after Slovakia had withdrawn its veto in exchange for gas guarantees and after Malta had obtained corrections on maritime regulations. In February 2024, the maxi aid package to Kiev only passed after a long tug-of-war in the European Council, which had to sew up annual revision guarantees in order to defuse a veto. The result was always the same: the Union ended up moving, but with delays that weakened its political message and gave external partners - from the United States to Russia - the impression of a hesitant and divided Europe. For those calling for qualified majority voting, these cases are not exceptions but the rule, the example of how the world does not wait for the Twenty-seven national agendas to align.

The reform front is led by Germany and France, flanked by Italia, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and several Nordic and Baltic countries. In 2023 the German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock had openly said it was "time for more majority decisions" in the CFSP, with a "safety net" to protect vital national interests. On the other hand, Hungary remains in the trenches, determined to defend the veto as an instrument of political leverage, and finds backing in governments that fear that qualified majority voting will end up translating into the hegemony of large countries. For Budapest, as well as for other smaller or geographically exposed states,unanimity forces compromise and confers internal legitimacy to common decisions: removing that guarantee would mean risking fractures that are difficult to recompose.

It is worth remembering, for those who fear the 'rip-off', that primary law already recognises alternatives to the rigidity of the veto without distorting intergovernmental logic. The general passerelle of Article 48(7) TEU allows unanimity to be transformed into qualified majority voting in individual areas, subject to the absence of objections from national parliaments: a mechanism designed to give more agility without taking control away from the states. The specific passerelle of Article 31(3) is tailor-made for the CFSP, and would allow the European Council, again by unanimous decision, to extend qualified majority voting to circumscribed matters such as sanctions or civil missions. On the other hand, military and defence decisions, which are considered an intangible core of sovereignty, remain armoured by unanimity.

In parallel, Article 31 itself offers two political valves: the constructive abstention, which allows a state not to apply a decision without blocking it for everyone, and the emergency brake, which allows the dossier to be brought back to the European Council if a government invokes vital national policy reasons. It is a 'flexibility triangle'never applied so far for fear of opening precedents or losing negotiating levers, but potentially capable of speeding up decision-making without splitting the Union.

With 27 states today and possibly more than 30 tomorrow, Brussels can no longer afford to remain hostage to the veto.