Europe and the US, the different recipes of the nationalists

We know few things. We certainly know, however, that nationalism is dangerous. It distorts the interdependencies between countries, fomenting rivalries between them, with unpredictable outcomes. Yet today, nationalism (economic and political, right and left) defines the terms of political confrontation. It does not lack internal contradictions, but those are not enough to contain it. Let us look at its characteristics on both sides of the Atlantic. Let us begin with American nationalism. Donald Trump provided a political identity to a nationalist sentiment that had begun to make itself felt since the 1990s. Behind that sentiment, there are social groups and territorial areas that have paid the costs of the globalisation process, lacking the tools (social, cultural, labour) to turn that process into an opportunity.

This created a psychological feeling of closure on which the nationalist humus grew, characterised by the principle 'my country before others'. Political actors and religious movements with their own agendas, which are not necessarily congruent with the nationalist agenda, then inserted themselves into that humus. It is not individual policies that identify Trumpian nationalism, but its anti-state vision (or resentment). Hence, the paradox that characterises it. Unlike the nationalisms of the past, current American nationalism is anti-institutional and anti-governmental, based as it is on fierce criticism of the military and intelligence deep state, but also of the social state that promotes public education or protection. It is a market nationalism, rather than a state nationalism. However, if state nationalism is actionable, much less so is market nationalism. Particularly in a market the size of the American one that cannot function outside interdependence. For Reagan, 'the state was the problem, not the solution'. For Trump, the state is the enemy, not just the problem, an enemy to be fought and not a problem to be solved.

Let us now look at European nationalism. The anti-statist vision of American nationalism is not easily borrowed by nationalists on the old continent. In Europe, not only is the market much more dependent on the state than in America, but above all the size of the individual 'nation states' is already too small to be further reduced. European nationalists cannot be anti-statalists, even if their (national) statehood is no longer sufficient. Hence, their ambiguous relationship with the European Union (EU). Without the EU, many policies to defend national interests would not be viable (think of the pandemic response). With the EU, however, many nationalist policies are impracticable (think of the attempts to dismantle the rule of law in Hungary or Poland before 2023 opposed by the European Commission or the European Court of Justice). There is thus a (also) European paradox. The EU is needed by the nationalists but simultaneously rejected by them. A paradox from which European nationalists, left and right, have tried to free themselves with the banal populist narrative, 'we are not against the nation state (and how could they be), but we are against the liberal elites in Brussels who aim to domesticate it'. For the nationalist Giuseppe Conte, leader of the Five Star Movement who is a member of the extreme left-wing grouping of the European Parliament 'The Left' (of which La France Insoumise and the German Die Linke are members), the previous Commission of Ursula von der Leyen was the expression 'of the strong powers', just as the latter continue to be represented by Joe Biden's administration. Not differently thinks the nationalist Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, which is part of the extreme right-wing grouping in the European Parliament, 'Patriots for Europe'. The nationalist extremes touch each other, their statements overlap. The nationalists need the EU, yet they see it as an enemy to be fought.

Predictably, the internal contradictions of nationalisms (American and European) will make their hegemony difficult. However, their opponents cannot rely on them to counter them. Supporters of openness will have to readjust their approach, considering that there are social classes and territorial areas that are penalised by the processes of transition from one economic-productive model to another. They must take over some nationalist themes, transferring them to a supranational (in Europe) or transcontinental (in America) level. We must think of a new political platform with which to generate resources and win time, a political platform that can only be a more economically and politically integrated Europe and America. Nationalism cannot be fought with anti-nationalism, but with a post-national strategy that pursues a transition (technological, digital, environmental) capable of ensuring cohesion and innovation at the same time. In short, nationalism constitutes the most threatening challenge to the development model created after World War II. That model must be defended, while building the transcontinental foundations for its reform. Old challenges must be countered with new answers.