From the cyber army to a centre for countering information warfare, here is Crosetto's plan against hybrid threats

Attacks and security threats are increasingly hybrid. And that is why an ad hoc strategy involving Nato and the European Union must be outlined. Speaking in question time at the Chamber of Deputies on Wednesday 12 November, Defence Minister Guido Crosetto outlined a new hybrid warfare response architecture, which envisages the creation of a new initial capability dedicated to cyber defence and a command centre for hybrid warfare, designed to counter the cognitive and informational threats that affect the country.

"The hybrid threat is a continuous war that affects us every day, day and night. It is necessary to define within NATO, with the European Union, common strategies that strengthen democratic and cognitive resilience and promote coordinated responses to attacks," he explained. "In these terms, I have drawn up a working document that I will make available to Parliament, in which we have outlined the main operational regulatory guidelines necessary to make defence more modern, effective, and ready to counter hybrid threats. The document envisages, for example, the recognition of the cyberspace as a true national defence area, the establishment of a cybersweapon with an initial capacity of about 1,200 1,500 operational units, equipped with adequate legal protection for civilian and military personnel'.

With regard to the proposals, Crosetto also spoke of the 'creation of a hybrid warfare centre to combat cognitive and informational warfare and the updating of the regulatory framework to allow more timely and coherent defence postures in the new scenarios. In this regard, we will present a draft law for the overall reorganisation of Defence to implement these lines. I note with satisfaction,' Crosetto concluded, 'that we are finally beginning to talk about it even at the European tables, where the subject was absent until now. The real question today is no longer what we have to do, but how quickly we will be able to do it together with our allies'.

Already in the past - the last time in mid-October - the Defence chief has provided guidance on the 'cyber army'. Italy will have a cyber army to defend a domain, the digital one, on a par with land, sea, air, and space. "An initial structure that can count on 1,200-1,500 units, largely operational, should start, but the goal," he explained in a video message broadcast at ComoLake, "is to arrive at a larger, fully autonomous force, capable of acting effectively across the entire threat spectrum. The cyber dimension,' he emphasised, 'is now the operational domain of security, together with land, sea, air and space. Defending it requires delicate, constant and integrated capabilities. This is where the idea of a national cyber weapon with a civil and military component capable of operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year takes shape'.

In the meantime, the European Commission has launched the 'European Democracy Shield', which envisages a series of measures with the declared aim of 'strengthening, protecting and promoting strong and resilient democracies' in the Old Continent. Complementing the shield, an EU strategy for civil society was also presented, which aims at greater 'involvement, protection and support' for civil society organisations that play 'essential roles in our societies'. The most concrete component of the 'shield' will be a new European Centre for Democratic Resilience, which will bring together the expertise and resources of the EU and member states with the aim of increasing the 'collective capacity to anticipate, detect and respond to threats and build democratic resilience'. A senior EU official explained that it will employ staff already active in the Commission and the EEAS, but it has not yet been decided with what numbers. With regard to those countries, such as Hungary, where the rule of law is already threatened, the shield will be substantially inactive: the senior official explained that the Commission has already acted with several 'infringement procedures', some of which have already led to Budapest being sentenced to pay fines. Penalties that Viktor Orban's government pays, considering them the price for keeping itself autonomous from Brussels in what it considers to be areas pertaining to its national sovereignty. The Article 7 procedure, which in theory could suspend Hungary's voting rights in the Council, has been blocked for years because it would require unanimity among 26. With the member states 'at the centre', according to the Commission, the Centre will 'serve as a framework to facilitate information sharing and support capacity building to resist evolving common threats, in particular the manipulation and interference of foreign information and disinformation'.