Gas on the rise on Putin's words: time ran out for transit in Ukraine

'The problem,' the president acknowledges, 'is that Gazprom has long-term contracts until 2035, until 2049, and to change the situation these contracts have to be changed: a complex procedure, difficult to solve.' It is likely that the reference is to the contractual clauses specifying what the gas delivery point should be: to change it requires the consent of both parties, but it is not necessarily impossible to find it.

Even Eni - although it has opened an international arbitration against Gazprom - is still bound to the Russian company by a long-term supply contract, which will only expire in 2035. Italy, however, does not risk any gas shortages in the event of the interruption of transit in Ukraine, only the probable price increases that will result: our country has long obtained no more than 5-10% of its imports of this fuel from Russia, volumes that could be costly but not difficult to replace, thanks to the regasifiers and other supply routes that we have at our disposal.

Not all Gazprom's remaining customers are in the same situation. Slovakia in particular - which would bear the brunt of the damage from the loss of the 'Ukrainian route' - would happily renegotiate any contractual clause in order to maintain the status quo or something very similar. And it is likely that this is also what Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico discussed during his surprise visit to the Kremlin a few days before Christmas: a meeting about which few details emerged.

In the evening of Friday 27 Fico raised the tone, even to the point of threatening Ukraine with retaliation in the event of a halt to Russian gas transit: 'We will assess the situation and the possibility of reciprocal measures,' he said. 'If unavoidable, we will stop the electricity supplies Ukraine needs when there are network disruptions.

Ukraine itself - although it has steadfastly refused to renew or renegotiate a transit contract with Gazprom - is not an insurmountable obstacle to new agreements, beyond appearances. By losing Russian gas, Kiev risks having to dismantle a large part of its own network, which would become oversized (as well as a potential target for bombing), and it has repeatedly suggested that it would not strictly oppose the passage of supplies taken over by non-Russian parties.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in recent days appeared to be open to the possibility of continuing the transits even if the holder remained Gazprom, provided that the gas fee is held (supposedly in an escrow account) until the end of the war.

As a recent analysis by the Oies reminds us, any solution would require at least a technical agreement between Gazprom and GTSOU, the Ukrainian grid operator, concerning the interconnection points from which Russian gas would eventually continue to enter the Kiev grid. This could, however, be feasible, notes the Oies, as it would be 'only a technical document, not a political or commercial agreement'. Moreover, Kiev has already agreed to similar conditions to avoid disrupting the transit of Russian oil to Ukraine.

Following this route would cut off Naftogaz, Gazprom's current counterpart, with whom it is indeed difficult to imagine new agreements. There are several legal disputes opposing the two companies. And Putin has not forgotten to call them out: 'Despite the war we have paid and continue to pay for transit. Drop the charges against us in court'.