Russia’s hybrid war against Italy and the Mediterranean: social media and very young people in the crosshairs

The infiltration system, moreover, does not follow a single channel. In Italia, Moscow can exert influence through pro-Russian circles and Russian associations, through individuals with a clear pro-Russian stance and, as we have seen, through bloggers and influencers who are directly funded and, in some cases, even hosted on Russian territory. Then there is the more opaque level: profiles not immediately traceable to the Russian Federation, used to infiltrate circles of intelligence interest, particularly in the defence and NATO contexts.

On the cyber front, the capacity to detect and counter such threats has grown. Over the past year, attacks have been aimed both at espionage – with a particular focus on the Government and its ministries – and at rendering the targeted systems inoperable. These operations cannot always be directly attributed to the Kremlin. In several cases, ‘hacktivist-style cyber-gangs’ have come into play: activists who, according to analyses, are in fact closely linked to Moscow’s secret service.

Then there is another aspect, which emerged very clearly in Ceuta, the Spanish enclave in Morocco: the use of migration flows as a means of exerting pressure. Last summer’s crisis, with over 50,000 migrants crowding towards Ceuta, was interpreted by analysts and European institutions as a hybrid and cognitive warfare operation, fuelled and amplified by Russian disinformation. On social media, channels linked to the Kremlin circulated false information: ranging from claims that the European Commission would grant automatic asylum to the assertion that it would be impossible to deport anyone who managed to reach Ceuta by swimming. These messages acted as a ‘pull factor’, driving thousands of people towards the enclave.

This is precisely one of the scenarios on which Italian intelligence has long been focusing its attention. Irregular migration is no longer viewed merely as a phenomenon to be managed at the borders, but also as a tool that hostile actors – both state and non-state – can use to exert geopolitical pressure on other countries.

Hybrid warfare, in this case, operates on two levels. The cognitive level: disinformation, AI-driven bots, the artificial amplification of destabilising content, and campaigns capable of influencing public opinion and eroding trust in institutions. And the material level: concentrating migratory pressure on a country to the point of causing social tensions, humanitarian crises and difficulties in administrative management. The flow of migrants thus becomes more than just a consequence of crises: in the hands of a hostile actor, it can be transformed into a tool for creating new ones.

It is the ‘grey zone’ model. No drone has been claimed by the Russian state. But there is a series of pressures, incursions, propaganda and interference in which attribution remains difficult and the threshold for military conflict is not formally crossed.

And it is this prospect that is causing concern amongst the intelligence services. The tension is not confined to Europe’s eastern flank, but is spreading towards the Mediterranean. For Italia, the risk is not necessarily that of becoming a military target. It is the risk of becoming one of the arenas in which hybrid warfare can be waged: in computer networks, on social media, within public opinion and even through the pressure of migration flows.