Opinions

If the housing emergency exacerbates the demographic crisis

(AdobeStock)

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

A marked decline in birth rates is sweeping Europe, sparing no country. It also affects contexts that until a few years ago managed to keep the average number of children per couple close to 2. The concern is twofold. On the one hand there are the complicated consequences to manage: reduction of the labour force, increase in the ratio of elderly to active population, increasing pressure on welfare systems. On the other hand, there is a deeper issue: understanding the causes of the decline and identifying policies capable of reducing the gap between the number of children desired and actually having.

In France, for example, surveys continue to show an average desire for more than 2 children, while the fertility rate is around 1.6. The fall in birth rates is therefore not simply attributable to a 'crisis of family values', let alone a refusal to have children. But it is also true that the generic declaration of wanting children is less and less predictive of an actual intention to have them.

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Having children in advanced societies is a free choice, no longer socially prescribed, and consequently less and less taken for granted. It depends on the objective conditions of the present - work, income, housing, services - but also on a positive vision of the future. The birth of the first child, in particular, has remained the only irreversible event in the transition to adult life in a world full of uncertainties. Understandably, it brings with it a high burden of commitment and responsibility.

Among the various obstacles, one stands out particularly strongly across Europe: access to housing. Over the last fifteen years, according to Eurostat data, the European Union has seen an average increase in house sale prices of over 50% and in rents of over 25%. Large cities, where educational and job opportunities are concentrated, are also the places where the gap between supply and demand is most acute. Suburban or rural areas are more accessible, but offer fewer employment opportunities. This creates a structural tension between work and housing.

The new generations are particularly affected, as also highlighted in the report presented on 3 February by the ABI to the parliamentary commission of enquiry on the economic and social effects of demographic transition. The lower average incomes, the higher incidence of temporary contracts, the lower ability to accumulate savings for an advance on a mortgage (conditions that also hinder access to a supplementary pension) all weigh heavily.

The consequences young people see in their common experience: increasing age of leaving the parental home, forced cohabitation, difficulty in forming a stable couple. Many more young people live with their parents or in transitional solutions than would freely choose to do so.

It is also for these reasons that the European Commission has decided to put the issue at the top of the agenda with the European Affordable Housing Plan, recognising housing as a key element of social cohesion and economic competitiveness. Housing is not just an economic good. It is a symbolic and material prerequisite of family planning. It is not surprising, therefore, that the most recent research shows a relationship between housing stability and intentions to have children also in the Nordic countries. Even in the most recent French debate, the difficulty of access to housing is explicitly mentioned as an obstacle to the birth rate that needs to be addressed, along with economic support and leave that involves fathers more and offers adequate time for both parents at the time of birth.

Italia lags behind on all these fronts. If it is the whole of Europe that is lagging behind, in our country there remains a wide gap from the Scandinavian area, where childcare services are more consolidated and widespread; at the same time, recent efforts are also less incisive and systematic compared to contexts such as Spain and France, which are relaunching with greater vivacity policies of reconciliation and sharing of family responsibilities. In the face of these gaps and obstacles, continuing to repeat that it is Italian women and young Italians who do not want to have children contributes to providing the portrait of a country not interested in supporting such choices, with the consequence of tying them down or providing incentives to make them elsewhere.

If we really wanted to respond to the demographic crisis, we would better act on several levers in a coherent way: strengthening the solidity and quality of employment pathways; increasing the supply of affordable housing, especially in urban areas with high demand; guaranteeing instruments that harmonise working and living times for both genders; managing migration flows in a positive and forward-looking way; building a framework of policies that are stable over time and capable of generating trust.

In Italia, the potential gain from these measures is particularly high. Youth and female employment rates are among the lowest in Europe and the length of stay in the family of origin among the longest. An improvement on these fronts responds both to containing the causes of the low birth rate and to mitigating its consequences.

Ultimately, it is not a matter of 'convincing' people to have children, but of building a context that makes the new generations perceive that such a choice is positively integral to their paths of autonomy, mobility, personal and professional fulfilment.

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