The Economist’s Coffee Break

Immigration and employment: the figures, beyond the slogans

Italia attracts a less educated workforce than the OECD average. This may leave the country with little to show in terms of productivity gains and mean that younger people end up footing the bill. The point is not how many foreigners arrive, but which ones.

 (Adobe Stock)

3' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

3' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

Some fear that foreigners will take jobs away from Italians, leading to lower wages, placing a strain on the welfare system and fuelling crime; businesses and trade unions point out that without them, entire sectors of the economy would face difficulties, whilst demographers note that Italia is ageing and the workforce is set to shrink. Economic research paints a more nuanced picture: it measures not only average effects but also distributional ones; the effects depend on the skills of those arriving, the integration process and the extent to which the economy is able to utilise those skills.

Italia became a country of immigration relatively late, and as at 1 January 2026, the proportion of residents with foreign nationality stood at 9.4 per cent (Istat). For economic analysis, however, it matters less how many arrive and more who arrives. According to OECD indicators from 2023, in 2020 in Italia, 55 per cent of men born abroad had not completed lower secondary education: the highest proportion in Western Europe, compared with 26 per cent in Austria, 30 per cent in France and 19 per cent in the United Kingdom. Even more telling is the trend: between 2010 and 2020, that proportion fell in most European countries – by 15 percentage points in France, by 26 in Portugal – whilst in Italia it rose by 6. A recent study by Basso, Mathur and Peri (2026) notes that immigrants to Italia are relatively less educated by OECD standards, but so is the native population.

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This picture reflects structural factors: knowledge-intensive sectors are weak and offer few opportunities to graduates, whilst migration networks lower the costs of relocation for those who are similar to those who have already settled there.

When asked whether immigrants take jobs away from locals, economic literature suggests that immigration reduces employment opportunities for similar workers whilst creating them for complementary ones. Put simply, a foreign bricklayer competes with an Italian bricklayer for the same job, but more construction sites, thanks to the abundant labour supply, mean more work for the engineer and architect overseeing them. The availability of immigrant workers helps to reduce the cost of domestic and care services and enables qualified local women to work more, as documented for Italia by Barone and Mocetti (2011).

The line separating those who gain from those who lose, however, also runs along age lines (Smith, 2012), because an inexperienced 18-year-old may be more exposed to competition from a low-skilled immigrant than a 30-year-old is. Thirty-year-olds in technical and supervisory roles, on the other hand, may benefit from the greater availability of manual labour.

There is also an effect linked to working conditions. In various European countries, including Italia, foreign workers are over-represented in occupations with a higher risk of accidents. The presence of immigrants can push native workers towards safer and less physically demanding jobs, as studies carried out in the United Kingdom and Spain show. This could be a benefit, but only if the risk does not end up being borne by those who, due to weak contractual positions or irregular status, are unable to secure fair pay for their work

So far, we’ve looked at who gains and who loses. But for a country with weak growth, the real question is another: does this immigration affect productivity? A firm with a large supply of low-cost labour can organise its production around this, using more labour and investing less in automation; and every firm that invests less in technology reduces the incentive for others to invest, and vice versa. When, on the other hand, immigrants are better educated than the native population, the mechanism is reversed and the system shifts towards a state of high productivity.

The evidence presented in Basso, Mathur and Peri (2026), covering 38 OECD countries, shows that immigration by people with a university education is associated with faster productivity growth and greater business investment in machinery and technology; whereas immigration by those with a low level of education shows, by contrast, a small and non-significant association.

We cannot simply conclude that ‘immigration is good’ or ‘bad’ – and here we have been discussing employment and productivity, not security or social cohesion, which have their own data and literature. The risk is that Italia will slide, through inertia, into a model that reaps the immediate benefits – cheap labour, less physically demanding jobs for Italians – whilst reaping little of the productivity gains achieved elsewhere. The effects depend on the choices available: what skills to attract based on labour market conditions, how to train the most vulnerable home-grown workers, and to what extent to enable businesses to invest.

*University of Salerno

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