Austerity, la ricetta di Modi: basta comprare oro e voli all’estero
dal nostro corrispondente Marco Masciaga
by Guido Camera, Stefano D'Errico* and Elio Santangelo*
4' min read
4' min read
After the Gip of Pordenone, the magistrates of Macerata (order of 28 March) and Siena (order of 18 April) also raise the unconstitutionality of driving after having taken drugs or psychotropic substances as per Article 187 of the Highway Code, as amended by the recent reform (law 177/2024). Under scrutiny is the removal of the driver's state of psychophysical impairment from the requirements for the integration of criminal conduct.
The Gip of Macerata stigmatises the irrationality of the novelty with an effective paradox. Since the legislature has limited itself to punishing those who drive 'after' having taken drugs - without specifying any time limitation - those who have taken drugs at the age of 18 and get behind the wheel at 60 should also be charged. If, on the other hand, the term 'after' were to refer to a moment closer to driving, the rule would be inapplicable, since the magistrate could not be asked to 'create' the precept by determining the moment of taking that is relevant from a penal point of view.
The temporal node appears crucial for the constitutionality test: one has to understand whether a constitutionally oriented interpretation can be admitted. It could be facilitated by the 'recovery' of the altered state that seems to derive from the guidelines on the assessment procedures issued on 11 April by the Ministries of the Interior and Health, which assume that the offence can be said to be integrated only on the condition that 'the substance still produces its effects in the body while driving'.
The Marches Gip then pointed out a discrepancy between the elimination of the state of alteration that affected paragraph 1 of Article 187 and the subsequent paragraph 2-bis (unamended), where alteration remained the condition that allowed the traffic police to subject drivers to analytical toxicological tests.
Lastly, the irrationality of the legislative choice with regard to the protection of road safety is highlighted: driving without a licence is liable to a mere administrative sanction even if it relates to conduct that is more dangerous than that of a person who has taken drugs but is driving when the effects have completely ceased.