Istat: 41% of households will be one person by 2050

In 2050, one in five families in Italy will be composed of a couple with children (today three in 10), while 41.1% of families will be formed by single persons (today 36.8%). This is what emerges from the latest ISTAT demographic forecasts, updated to 2024. The average number of members per family in 2050 will be 2.03 (compared to 2.21 in 2024). It is also expected that the over-65s living alone in 2050 will be 6.5 million, compared to 4.6 million in 2024.

The latest demographic forecasts, updated to 2024, outline a transition process within which the weight of today's population age structure prevails over expected demographic behaviour, albeit within a framework of uncertainty. In turn, further increases in survival, low birth rates and family transformations confirm an ongoing change in the population structure that will lead to a self-reinforcing ageing process, despite the positive contribution of migration from abroad. The resident population, today about 59 million, is expected to decrease to 54.7 million by 2050, with a gradual but steady decline over time. By the same year the share of the elderly aged 65 and over rises to 34.6 per cent (from 24.3 per cent), the share of those aged 15-64 drops to 54.3 per cent (from 63.5 per cent). The share of young people up to 14 years of age drops by one percentage point (from 12.2 to 11.2%).

Considering the extremes of the 90% confidence intervals, in the most favourable hypothesis, the population could suffer a loss of 'only' 6.2 million between 2024 and 2080, of which 2.2 million already by 2050. Conversely, in the worst-case scenario, in 2080 the population would have 20.0 million fewer individuals than today, 6.5 million of whom would already have been lost by 2050. In conclusion, it seems inevitable that the population will decrease, even if the numerical evidence is profoundly different from each other, which calls into the picture not only demographic but also social and economic scenarios with equally different impacts.

The entire national territory will be affected by progressive depopulation, but with some geographical differences. This variability will cause the phenomenon to reach a more significant dimension in the South than in the Centre-North. According to the median scenario, a slight but significant population increase is expected in the North in the short term (+1.1‰ per year until 2030). On the contrary, in the Centre (-1.3‰) and especially in the South (-4.8%), a decline in residents is expected. In the intermediate period (2030-2050), and even more so in the long term (2050-2080), the decline in population will be generalised in all geographical divisions, but in the South the intensity of the decrease will reach higher levels. In the long term, the population of the North could shrink by 2.8 million inhabitants by 2080, but by only 200,000 when looking at 2050. Quite different is the evolutionary path of the population in the South, which could shrink by 7.9 million inhabitants by 2080, 3.4 million of them already by 2050. The uncertainty accompanying the evidence described above may lead in part to different assessments. In the North, for example, a path of slight but steady population growth (up to 1.1 million more residents by 2080) is also potentially possible, as represented by the upper bound of the confidence interval. Conversely, in both the Centre and the South such a possibility is never contemplated, even under the most favourable scenario assumptions.