The Annual Report

Istat: 'Demographic winter affects 30% of companies. Generational changeover at risk'

From the survey, presented by President Chelli, a picture of a country where different generations live together longer

by Carlo Marroni

6' min read

6' min read

Demography erodes generational change in the economy: enterprises at risk of generational turnover (where the ratio of employees aged 55 and over to those under 35 is greater than 1.5) are 30.2 per cent. However, this critical condition is strongly concentrated in enterprises with less than three employees (characteristic of many service activities and where employment largely coincides with self-employment), where it reaches 35.1 per cent of economic units, falling to 17.4 per cent in those with between 3 and 9 employees, and 3.7 per cent in small enterprises with between 10 and 49 employees. The ISTAT Annual Report - presented today by President Francesco Maria Chelli in the Chamber of Deputies - analyses the country's situation in depth, and this year in particular offers a completely new demographic cross-section: the extraordinary increase in survival, in fact, has radically transformed the structure of the Italian population and its economic impact, giving rise to a society in which several generations now live together for longer. Their life courses have contributed to redefining the demographic, social and economic context of the country. This in a context of moderate growth and progressive loss of purchasing power, up to 10% from 2019 to last March.

Italy, one of the oldest countries in the world. In the last ten years, net loss of 97 thousand graduates

Italy remains one of the oldest countries in the world, with a quarter of the population aged 65 and over and more than 4.5 million individuals aged 80 and over. Meanwhile, birth rates continue to fall, with 370,000 new births in 2024 and a fertility rate that has dropped to 1.18 children per woman. In the context of an increasingly weak generational turnover, the contribution of migration remains decisive. The resident foreign population and new Italian citizens are the only growing components. Entries from abroad reach 435,000 in 2024 and acquisitions of citizenship also reach new highs. However, emigration is also on the rise, particularly among qualified young Italians. In the last ten years, the country has experienced a net loss of about 97 thousand graduates aged between 25 and 34, with a strong impact on the human capital available for development.

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Demographic changes are intertwined with family changes.

Smaller and smaller households. Absolute poverty affects 5.7 million

Families are getting smaller and smaller: the number of people living alone is growing, free unions, single-parent families and reconstituted families are on the rise, while the number of households with children is shrinking. Single-person households account for more than a third of the total, while couples with children stand at 28.2 per cent. Almost 40 per cent of people aged 75 and over live alone, in most cases women. The formation of new families and parenthood are increasingly postponed, reflecting both changes in cultural patterns and structural difficulties in accessing economic and housing independence for young people. The economic conditions of families remain fragile. Absolute poverty affects about 5.7 million people, in particular families with children, young people, foreigners and residents in the South.

We enter 'adult life' late. More free unions and rebuilt families

Analyses by generation confirm a profound change in the way people enter adult life. Exit from the family increasingly takes place through informal cohabitation, while marriage and parenthood are postponed, or sometimes avoided altogether. Marriage shows a decreasing and postponing trend, with an increasing spread of free unions and reconstituted families. The drop in fertility, the most marked in recent decades, and growing marital instability complete the picture of a demographic transition in which family ties are diversifying and redefining themselves over time. It is clear that our country has been characterised by a pattern of low and late fertility for many generations. At the end of their reproductive history, women born at the beginning of the 1930s had on average had about two children per woman, if resident in the North and the Centre, and almost three in the South.

In the generational transition, the proportion of women without children doubles

Beginning with those born in the 1960s, a process of progressive convergence, below two children per woman, is noted in all the divisions, writes ISTAT. In the North, the 1933 generation was already below two children per woman, in the Centre the 1939 generation; in the South, on the other hand, you have to go as far as the 1961 generation. But the important fact is that in the transition from the hypothetical generation of mothers born in 1958 to that of their hypothetical daughters born in 1983, who are now over 40, the proportion of childless women doubles (from 13 per cent to an estimated 26 per cent), with a peak of about three out of ten women in the South. At the same time, there is a marked postponement of the age at which the first child is born, which increases the risk of having fewer children than expected or no children at all.

Lifestyles are changing: more sport, less smoking. But more obese children

Significant differences between generations become apparent when considering lifestyles. Starting with those born in the 1950s, continuous improvements in health-related behaviour can be observed: smoking rates are falling and attention to sport is growing. Alongside these positive signs, however, new criticalities are emerging: cases of overweight and obesity are increasing from childhood onwards, new forms of smoking are spreading (electronic cigarettes, heated tobacco products), and drunkenness, mainly due to the consumption of spirits, is a cause for concern among the youngest. The age at which people become elderly has also moved forward: 75-year-olds today can expect to live on average the same number of years as 64-year-olds in the 1950s.

Territorial gaps remain. In inland areas, ageing is intertwined with depopulation

But this progress is not uniform: gaps linked to territory, gender and socio-economic status remain marked. It is especially in the most fragile territories, such as the Inner Areas, that ageing is intertwined with depopulation, low fertility, youth emigration and reduced attractiveness for migratory flows from abroad. In these contexts, the presence of elderly people living alone is more frequent and risks making the informal support network (family, friends, neighbourhood) on which they can rely even more fragile than elsewhere. A crucial element marking the new generations of the elderly is the increase in human capital: today better educated than in the past, the new elderly live on average better, active for longer and with greater cultural resources. However, inequalities also emerge on this front, with the Inner Areas having a lower share of population with medium-high qualifications than the Centres. This disadvantage is reflected, more generally, in individual well-being.

Average income 2024 lower than 2004, but the effects were offset by smaller household size and home ownership

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Regarding the substantial loss of purchasing power associated with inflation in 2021-2022, ISTAT notes that the average labour income per employed person in 2024 is lower than in 2004. Over the same period, the increase in labour participation, the reduction in household size and the greater diffusion of home ownership more than offset this reduction in terms of equivalent household income. The effects in terms of loss of purchasing power of wages were, however, very different depending on the specific period considered. Between 2019 and 2021, even with very weak wage growth due to the substantial bargaining freeze brought about by the pandemic emergency, the reduction in purchasing power was rather limited, because it was concomitant with a period of low inflation. From the second half of 2021, on the other hand, the surge in energy commodity prices brought inflation to levels not seen since the 1980s (up to 12.6 per cent in October-November 2022), and wage dynamics were slow to adjust to the changed and unexpectedly high inflation scenario. Wage dynamics therefore remained particularly subdued until the end of 2022, accelerating only thereafter. The loss in purchasing power per employee with respect to January 2019, which from 2021 became increasingly significant until it exceeded 15 per cent at the end of 2022, was reduced to 8.7 per cent in February 2025, thanks to contract renewals and the deceleration of inflation, but rose again - as mentioned - to 10.0 per cent in March.

Chelli: between the early 1990s and 2023, the share of university graduates among 25-34 year olds rose from 7 per cent to over 30 per cent, and up to 37.1 among women

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President Chelli noted that the most important transformation in changing occupational characteristics and opportunities between generations is education. In 1980, almost half of all young people between the ages of 15 and 24 were in the labour force, while among their peers in 2024, one in four are active and more than two-thirds are inactive because they are still in education or training. Moreover,' added Chelli, 'between the early 1990s and 2023, the share of university graduates among 25-34 year-olds rose from 7 per cent to over 30 per cent, and up to 37.1 among women, who in this age group have achieved employment rates similar to those of their university-educated peers. "Thus, in the individual perspective, the effect of the fall in real income between 2004 and 2024 is mitigated by its increase over the active life cycle, in particular due to the premium of investment in education, which now extends to a larger share of adults. The growth in female employment has also made it possible to compensate at household level for the reduction in individual incomes'. The Report - he recalled - also investigates the relationship between population ageing and the evolution of the production system. In economic activity as a whole, general population dynamics and the postponement of the retirement age have led to a progressive ageing of the workforce between 2011 and 2022. "However, schooling, which is much higher among new entrants than among those who have retired, has led to an increase in the level of education of 0.7 equivalent years of study per employee, which corresponds to a growth of more than five percentage points in the share of university graduates among the employed, from 14.1 to 19.4 per cent.

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