Italgas: the Antitrust Authority opens investigation into the acquisition of 2i Rete Gas

The Antitrust has decided to open an inquiry into the purchase of 2i Rete Gas by Italgas. This is what can be read in the Authority's weekly bulletin, which also reports on the comments received on the transaction and its potential effects from Assogas, Acea, Ascopiave, Hera and Anima. In the device published by the Authority headed by Roberto Rustichelli, it is clarified that the 0peration, aimed at the exclusive control of 2i Rete Gas, constitutes a concentration and mainly concerns the gas distribution sector where the only possible form of competition, reads the document published on the Agcm website, "is that relating to participation in tenders for the entrusting of concessions that have expired".

Not by chance, it is on this front that the Antitrust Authority is focusing its attention, which has turned a spotlight on 32 Atem (the territorial areas into which gas distribution activities are divided and on the basis of which concessions are assigned to operators) in which each of the two operators controls a share of at least 20%. The concessions that fall under this condition are the following: Agrigento, Bari 2, Benevento, Brescia 5, Caltanissetta, Campobasso, Caserta 2, Catania 1, Frosinone 2, L'Aquila 2, Mantova 2, Massa Carrara, Matera, Messina 2, Milan 2, Naples 2, Novara 2, Padua 2, Padua 3, Potenza 1, Potenza 2, Ragusa, Reggio di Calabria-Vibo Valentia, Rome 4, Rome 5, Salerno 1, Salerno 3, Teramo, Turin 6, Trapani, Varese 1, Viterbo.

In these areas, the Antitrust Authority explains, the transaction could result in the elimination of one of the few plausible competitors in the tender and thus cause 'a direct competitive restriction' with the result of 'holding such a pronounced advantageous position in the tender' that it could also discourage potential third-party competitors from participating in the procedure. Ergo: in this case, the transaction could have significant effects on the competitive profile of the market.

In another group of concessions (Barletta-Andria-Trani, Caserta 1, Cosenza 2, and Pisa), on the other hand, 2i Rete Gas manages a share of the Pdr (meters) of the Atem included between 15 and 20% and therefore holds "a minor incumbency position compared to the previous group, but in any case not entirely negligible". In these Atem, the Antitrust still clarifies, there is a total absence of third party operators or a completely negligible presence. Ergo, even in these concessions, as for the other group, there could be 'a competitive restriction comparable to the direct one'. This could lead to 'a strengthening of the prevailing outgoing operator to the point of discouraging hypothetical participation of third parties in the tender'.

There is, finally, a last package of concessions (there are 29) and they concern the Atem of Alessandria 4, Ascoli Piceno, Asti, Cosenza 1, Cuneo 1, Foggia 2, Genova 2, Imperia, Isernia, Latina, Lecce 2, Lecco 2, Lodi 2, Lucca, Messina 1, Milano 3, Milano 4, Monza Brianza 1, Napoli 4, Palermo 2, Perugia 1, Pescara, Rieti, Rovigo, Savona 1, Savona 2, Siracusa, Terni, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola, the possible anticompetitive effects of the operation "appear to be mainly associated with the fact that it would entail an appreciable increase in the overall share of the dominant incumbent, to the extent that this could discourage the participation of third-party participants, making the Atem apparently not very contestable in the tender". In the remaining 36 Atem, where the parties have overlaps, there are, finally, no particularly significant effects on competition since the presence of one of the two operators is limited.