Justice is the duty of compassion
When Peter Singer arrives at Oxford in 1969, he is a young Australian student with a distracted air and empty pockets. Little does he imagine that from that grey, austere city one of the most influential moral revolutions of the century will take shape. As the son of Viennese Jews who escaped Nazism but grew up in a land far removed from European tragedies, Singer will always feel the tension between detachment and responsibility. The echo of horror does not leave him and, as he matures, it will translate into a question that will play a central role in his philosophy: how can we justify indifference to the suffering of others?
Quando, ventenne, lascia Melbourne per l’Inghilterra, la filosofia per lui è soprattutto esigenza di chiarezza logica: capire, definire, distinguere. Ma a Oxford, durante un seminario su Jeremy Bentham, accade qualcosa che lo segnerà per sempre. Una citazione del filosofo letta quasi di passaggio, gli resterà incisa come un comandamento laico: “La questione non è se possono ragionare o possono parlare. La questione vera è se possono soffrire” (cit. in Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 50). In quelle poche parole Singer trova la chiave di una nuova etica. La filosofia smette di essere un mestiere dello spirito e diventa, per lui, un compito pratico: capire come ridurre la sofferenza del mondo. Non si tratta più di chiedersi che cosa sia il Bene in senso metafisico, ma di calcolare con precisione le conseguenze delle nostre azioni, di rendere la compassione il motore delle nostre azioni.
From that drive comes a lucid, demanding approach, capable of judging individual and collective choices not according to emotions, but according to the actual effects they produce. Singer imagines, as he would later write, that we could look at the world from a 'non-place', without body or identity, like a pure consciousness observing the joy and pain distributed throughout the universe. From that impersonal perspective, we would learn that the ultimate goal of a just life can only be 'to desire the greatest possible happiness for the greatest possible number of living beings' (Practical Ethics, p. 12).
This is the moral posture that defines his entire philosophy: to move from the human to the universal point of view, from the partiality of the ego to the justice of impartiality. An ethics that measures the goodness of actions as one solves an equation, but to give calculation a soul; the soul of compassion that becomes a rational response to the suffering of others. Behind the analytical coldness, in fact, lies an ancient promise, that reason can still justify love.


