Diplokma / Pulse

Kivu, the border 'catastrophe' and EU agreements with Rwanda

Commissioner Lahbib denounces conditions on DR Congo's eastern border, but there are those who dispute mining agreements with one of the two parties

from our correspondent Alberto Magnani

Willy Ngoma, portavoce degli M23, ucciso da un attacco via drone a gennaio

3' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

3' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

Nairobi - No EU delegation had entered Goma, on the eastern borders of the Democratic Republic of Congo, since the beginning of the M23 advance in January 2025: the offensive by pro-Rwandan militiamen in conflict with the regular army in Kinshasa. After a visit to some facilities in the city, Commissioner Hadja Lahbib summed it up with one adjective. The most immediate: the situation is 'catastrophic', she said, highlighting 'increasing and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law'.

Lahbib, travelling between Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, announced the mobilisation of more than EUR 81 million 'in the Great Lakes region' and declared his pressure on the opening of 'humanitarian channels' for the inflow of aid into the region. The commitment 'must be fully respected', said Lahbib, even if the premises of the crisis hang in the balance and there are those who point out an original short-circuit: the mining agreements signed by Brussels with Rwanda, one of the two de facto factions in the conflict, in the crosshairs of international observers for its support to the M23 militias and the illicit trafficking of minerals extracted on the eastern borders of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Democratic Republic of Congo itself has accused Brussels of a 'double standard' between criticising Kigali and maintaining trade agreements.

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Something has moved since then. The EU High Commissioner for Foreign Policy, Kaja Kallas announced the start of a 'review' of the agreements and the EU itself sanctioned some figures linked to the M23. Still not enough, according to the criticism of those who accuse Brussels of a too 'passive' approach compared to the scope of the crisis and the negotiating power implicit in the agreements.

The conflict in DR Congo and the role of the EU

The conflict in Kivu, a province on the eastern borders of the Democratic Republic of Congo, is being waged between the Congolese regular army and allies against the M23 militiamen, an acronym of the 23 March Movement, a faction of Tutsi rebels operating in the area and believed to be financed by Rwanda (Kigali has always denied this).

Hostilities have erupted intermittently in recent years, accelerating in early 2025 with the advance of the M23 across the border, the conquest of Goma and aims of expansion on the rest of the eastern border. The exact accounting of the crisis fluctuates between different estimates, although EU data itself registers at least 8.2 million Congolese displaced persons and 28 million citizens reduced to acute hunger. Theoretically, DR Congo and Rwanda were supposed to have reached a truce brokered by the US and Qatar in December, the so-called 'Washington accords', along a double track of mining agreements and a ceasefire from hostilities. The former seems to have been set in motion, the latter faltered from the outset and recorded several violations after and during the very signing of the agreements. The temperature of the clash may rise again after a drone attack killed M23 spokesman Willy Ngoma.

Against the background of the dispute, and its diplomatic implications, Brussels has always espoused a line of balance, criticised by some as ambivalence. EU condemnations of Rwanda's opacities on the M23 have also resulted in sanctions, without, however, affecting the agreements at the heart of the criticism: the memorandum of understanding signed in June 2024 and intended to baste a collaboration on 'sustainable raw materials value chains'. The understanding formalises 'close cooperation' between the EU and Rwanda in the five areas of integration of minerals value chains, cooperation on sustainable and responsible production, mobilisation of financing for infrastructure, research and innovation for technology sharing and building of capacity, the building of technical capacity on the supply chain.

The EU Parliament openly condemned the arrangement and spoke out against the 'abuses' imputed to Kigali in its overall activities only in September 2025. The sharpest change of course should be included in the 'review' announced by the EU foreign minister and the retaliatory measures announced by Brussels. The effects are likely to be imperceptible: 'The EU seems to have given up most of its political influence,' explains Philippe Dam of Human Rights Watch, a US-based NGO. 'Instead of exerting pressure, it has adopted a passive stance, failing to use existing instruments, such as sanctions and bilateral agreements, as a political warning to Rwanda.

Despite the fact that the memoranda of understanding called for transparency and accountability, 'Kigali has failed on both fronts,' says Dam. 'The EU must make it clear that Rwanda will face a political cost for its behaviour in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo; the 'review' announced by Kaja Kallas is meaningless without concrete actions and evidence of real improvement on the ground.

*This article is part of the Pulse project and was produced in cooperation with the Hvg-Eurologus newspaper.

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  • Alberto Magnani

    Alberto MagnaniCorrispondente

    Luogo: Nairobi

    Lingue parlate: inglese, tedesco

    Argomenti: Lavoro, Unione europea, Africa

    Premi: Premio "Alimentiamo il nostro futuro, nutriamo il mondo. Verso Expo 2015" di Agrofarma Federchimica e Fondazione Veronesi; Premio giornalistico State Street, categoria "Innovation"

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