Liberal countries and the war of defence against terrorism

As we saw last week, within the framework of the ideal theory, Rawls identifies five basic principles of the Right of Peoples. The fifth principle refers to the formal equality that binds the right to war of the members of the League of Peoples only to reasons of self-defence. "Well-ordered peoples," Rawls states, "do not declare war on one another; they only go to war when they sincerely and reasonably believe that their safety and protection are seriously endangered by the expansionist policy of the outlawed states", because in the context of the Law of Peoples, paradoxical as it may seem, the purpose of a just war can only be the search for a just and lasting peace.

But the main theme of Rawlsi's analysis of war concerns not so much the jus ad bellum but the so-called jus in bello, not so much the analysis of the legitimate reasons for entering into war, but the conditions and limitations that must be observed in its conduct. The first element to be clarified is that relating to the responsibility of those who, in various forms, participate in war. In this regard, a distinction must be made between leaders and political officials on the one hand and soldiers and the civilian population on the other. The ratio of this distinction lies in the fact that since 'outlaw' states are non-democratic states, the responsibility for the choice to declare war cannot be placed even indirectly on the civilian population. The responsibility lies with the leaders and elites who control the state. They are responsible. "They wanted war," Rawls writes, "and, for that reason, they are criminals.

But the civilian population, often kept in ignorance and influenced by state propaganda, is not responsible'. Rawls' absolute condemnation of the Americans' use of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for example, is based on this consideration. Use that resulted in an attack aimed primarily at the civilian population, who were blameless from a moral point of view for the conduct of their leaders. The responsibility of the soldiers, in this sense, is also to be considered limited. They, like civilians, cannot be held responsible for the decision to go to war.

"Because soldiers," the philosopher writes again, "are often conscripted and otherwise forced into war; they are coercively indoctrinated in martial virtues; and their patriotism is often cruelly exploited. Unlike civilians, however, soldiers may be attacked not because they are responsible for the war, but because those attacked by 'outlaw' states may have no choice but to defend themselves. This defence must respect, as far as possible, the human rights of the civilian population and the opposing soldiers. The reasons Rawls gives for this prescription are twofold: the first concerns the fact that according to the Law of Peoples even the enemy, like all other human beings, cannot be excluded under any circumstances, even in war, from the enjoyment of these rights. The second reason has to do with the example that such conduct can provide to soldiers and civilians of the enemy state, in particular, with the intention of foreshadowing already during the war the conditions of the peace they wish to create with the state now attacking them. This is a primary responsibility of the politicians and ruling classes of well-ordered countries. And it is a very important responsibility, because, as Rawls writes: 'The manner in which a war is fought and the actions taken to end it live on in the historical memory of societies and may or may not lay the foundations for future wars. It is always the duty of political authority to take this long-term view'.

In his discussion of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, of the reasons, that is, that can legitimately lead to an entry into war and the conditions of its legitimate conduct, Rawls admits an explicit debt of gratitude to Michael Walzer and his Just and Unjust Wars(Laterza, 2009) - 'an impressive work'. In the preface to that book, Walzer, a philosopher of Jewish origin, writes: 'It is my intention to defend on this occasion too (most of) the arguments with which we justified our opposition to the American war in Vietnam, but at the same time, and more importantly, I aim above all to defend the right to reason'.

How can one fail to grasp the importance of this right to reason about the roots of war that Walzer speaks of especially in these times, in light of the international situation we are experiencing and the conflicts it fuels. A particularly relevant example, especially today, of the exercise of this 'right to reason' concerns the analysis of the conditions of asymmetrical warfare between a liberal state and terrorist movements. In the essay entitled Terrorism: critique of excuses, Walzers writes 'Today no one defends terrorism, not even those who practice it. This practice is indefensible (...) not only does it kill innocent people, but it insinuates fear into everyday life, the violation of private spaces, the insecurity of public ones, the endless coerciveness of necessary precautions'.

Terrorism is indefensible on a moral level even by those who practise it, yet despite its immorality there remain many other possible ideological excuses for its use. "Terrorist organisations are not without supporters," writes Walzer, "an indirect but far from ineffective support. It takes the form of apologetic descriptions and explanations, a litany of excuses that decisively undermines our knowledge of evil'. A knowledge that Walzer feels the need to supplement and strengthen precisely with a systematic critique of the excuses whose fallacy cannot be taken for granted, but must be discussed and argued. So let us open this discussion today. First of all, with all those young people who in good faith contest a reality that appears terrible to them anyway, in which they see - perhaps erroneously? - the overpowering of the weaker by the stronger. And then with the whole of public opinion to which it is right not to provide too many easy simplifications and, lastly, within the international community where, unfortunately, polarisation rather than discussion seems to be increasing day by day.

Let us try, then, to analyse these excuses that are put forward to justify the practice of terrorism. The most common one is the one according to which terrorism would be the last option one decides to resort to only after having ascertained the failure of every other possible avenue. But if all possible avenues have been pursued, one might retort, then one should go no further. One should give up. One should accept the consequences of failure. No other option is available. 'But this response,' Walzer writes, 'merely restates the principle, ignoring the excuse: this response does not take into account the terrorists' desperation. Whatever their cause, we must recognise that, given their dedication, the only thing they cannot do is "do nothing more"'.

However, it would be necessary to ask oneself whether all possible alternatives have really been tried, whether all available avenues have really been taken. Has every effort really been made? Was every help requested? Was every possible action taken? Answering these questions in the affirmative always seems very complex. Perhaps then it will be necessary to admit that that of terrorism is not really the last viable road, but only and dramatically the quickest and most hasty. Walzer writes: 'The same argument applies to state officials who claim to have tried "everything" and are now forced to kill hostages or bomb farmers' villages. Imagine these people summoned before a court and forced to answer the question: "What exactly did you try to do?". Does anyone really believe that they could provide a plausible list?". Let us return to Rawls for a moment. In his analysis of the principles governing the conduct of defensive warfare by the 'Society of Peoples', he generally rules out the legitimacy of any form of civilian involvement in the conflict, with one exception: when there is no 'supreme emergency'. Walzer has a slightly different position on the subject. He is doubtful that terrorism can be justified on the basis of any 'supreme emergency', but restricts the field only to cases where 'the oppression to which the terrorists claim to be reacting is genocidal in character'.

There is a second type of excuse, one that refers to the struggle of national liberation movements against the actions of an oppressor state. The use of terrorism, in this case, Walzer tells us, is counterproductive for the supporters of the cause themselves. The use of terrorism, in fact, highlights on the one hand the weakness of the movement towards the oppressor state, but also that towards their own people, who evidently did not show a majority and convinced adherence to the liberation cause. This second justification therefore represents rather an aggravating circumstance. The third type of justification refers to the fact that, pragmatically, terrorism works and therefore it is permissible to use it to achieve one's aims. The validity of this justification is based on an empirical fact that seems, however, to find more support in the wishes of its proponents than in the history of conflicts. The last justification, finally, to which Walzer refers essentially says that every form of politics, by the very nature of the power it wields, is based on terror and coercion, and that above all the exercise of oppression even by legitimate governments is nothing but a disguised form of terrorism. Those we commonly call terrorists have simply thrown off the cynical mask that traditional politics still wears to hide its more brutal side.

All these excuses, in one way or another, are based on a preliminary fact: the existence of oppressed and oppressors. We are today, perhaps as never before, faced with a profound dilemma in having to make this distinction because we may have to admit the existence not only of terrorism by the oppressed but also of terrorist conduct by the oppressors. It is necessary then to understand what it is that makes the distinction. In what way is it possible to make this distinction. And this difference is not always clear-cut because, as Walzer writes, 'The message of the terrorists [whether they are oppressed or oppressors] is the same in both cases: the denial of the dignity and humanity of the groups among whom they make their victims'. We should all start asking ourselves, then, who is it that denies this dignity today? And, perhaps more importantly, who is left to claim it with a clear and resounding voice? Where is the right of peoples and where are the well-ordered peoples who can set an example of tolerance, acceptance, respect for human rights? And where are the enlightened and just leaders, those of countries at war and those of countries at peace? "Those who choose the politics of terror," Walzer writes again, "act 'freely' (...) We have a moral obligation never to excuse these leaders." Never excuse these leaders. They are the ones morally responsible for hostile actions. And that is why repression and retaliation must not repeat the wrongs of terrorism. And this means that they must systematically focus solely and exclusively on the terrorists. "Never on the people on whose behalf the terrorists claim to act, because this is always a dubious claim," Walzer emphasises, "even when it is in good faith: the people do not authorise terrorists to act in their name. Repression and retaliation, therefore, only make sense and have legitimacy if guided by the same principles that prohibit terrorism itself.

But back to the fundamental question: in which direction should we go, then, if all possibilities seem to be exhausted? First of all, it must be stated once again that the roads to be travelled, by definition, are never completely exhausted. There may be downhill roads and others uphill, easier roads and others more difficult. But above all, it must be reiterated that there is an alternative answer to terrorism. It is to address the root of the oppression that the terrorists claim to be fighting against. I am not claiming that this oppression is the cause of terrorist actions. That, as we have already said, lies in the rational choice of those cynical and evil leaders who decide to unleash the terrorist campaign. However, we cannot pretend we do not know that oppression is the fuel that fuels such choices, as is wounded dignity. "Terrorists exploit oppression," Walzer warns, "injustice and human misery in general, at least to gain excuses; it is hard to doubt that oppression strengthens them. Is this a reason to intervene in defence of the oppressed?' It certainly is, and it would certainly not be the only one. We are certain that it will never be possible to defeat the brutality of oppression with terrorism just as it will be impossible to defeat terrorism with the brutality of oppression.