Strategies

Migrants, Meloni and Sanchez's similarities on 'regular' flows

From the most diverse assumptions, the two premiers end up overlapping on certain models. Starting with the insistence on 'regular' migration

by Alberto Magnani (Il Sole 24 Ore, Italy), Lola García-Ajofrín (El Confidencial, Spain)

Il premier spagnolo Pedro Sanchez e il presidente senegalese Bassirou Diomaye Faye

7' min read

7' min read

Comparisons between leaders can be idle. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez's latest trip, a tour de force between Mauritania, Gambia and Senegal, has brought up a striking one: that between Sanchez himself and his Italian counterpart Giorgia Meloni. On paper the similarities are nil, starting with the antithesis between a face of EU social democracy and that of the Conservatives and Reformists in Brussels.

In essence, the policies of the two find some similarities in one of the areas of open conflict between progressive and conservative forces on an EU scale, the management of migration flows. Sanchez is renewing his agenda of agreements with countries of origin, expulsions and stimulating 'regular' migration, with the result that he finds himself on a similar wavelength to his Italian counterpart. The theoretical assumptions could not be more different, between the defence of the right to migrate reiterated by Sanchez and the line of rejections ridden for years by Meloni. The policies implemented are less so, especially when it comes to an approach to the 'regular' entry of migrants.

The migration chapter is one of the pillars of the political strategy of Giorgia Meloni, the Italian premier at the head of a right-wing coalition since the autumn of 2022. At the time of the election campaign and the pre-government season, Meloni insisted on the more ordinary tones and rhetoric of the ultra-c0nservative forces: from alarms about the 'invasion' to accusations of incompetence levelled at 'left-wing' governments in the management of landings, passing through the ideological battle against governmental organisations engaged in rescue operations in the Mediterranean. With his arrival in government, the mood and the bottom line have remained the same. But the approach has changed, adapting to the 'complications' that have emerged in the leap from the political polemics of the opposition years to the administration of public affairs from Palazzo Chigi. Looking at the numbers of landings, the most media-driven thermometer on the phenomenon, the first eight months of 2024 recorded 41,181 arrivals: a sharp drop from the 113,877 of 2023, in the first full year of the Mel0ni government, but smaller than the 56,458 of 2022. A fluctuating budget, like the government's own plans on the subject. Originally, the proposal reaffirmed by Meloni and her Fratelli d'Italia party was that of a tout court 'naval blockade': an initiative that would have consisted of a total barrage of flows, which quickly faded after Meloni's rise to government.

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"When it was not realised, because it was impossible, the government implemented strategies similar to those of the executives - even left-wing ones! - that preceded it,' points out Matteo Villa, researcher at the Italian research centre Ispi. In detail, Villa explains, the guidelines of the government's migration strategy are three: the externalisation of borders, with collaboration agreements in the departure destinations similar to the one signed with Kais Saied's Tunisia and extended to an EU agreement; the contrast to the operations of the NGOs in the Mediterranean, accused of acting as a pull factor for the departure of landings and limited with ad hoc interventions; the externalisation of arrivals, a model attempted in agreements such as the one signed with Albania: the creation of centres outside the Italian perimeter for the 'stay' of migrants awaiting repatriation.

The 'Tunisian' approach and the decline of migrants in Italy

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The only one that seems to have really affected the drop in numbers is the first model, that of departure border control, in a déjà-vu compared to the arrangement already broken by centre-left minister Marco Minniti in 2017 with Libya. "It is effective (cooperation, ed.) when the partners have an incentive in cooperating, as in the case of the Libyan militias or Tunisian President Saied," Villa points out, underlining the most obvious backlash of the understandings: the "brutality" imputed to the Libyan militias in the understanding with Tripoli and the cases of "deportation" contested to the Tunisian authorities after the last understanding with the EU, starting with migrants transported and abandoned on the country's desert borders.

In a video, posted by the Libyan Interior Ministry on its Facebook page, a group of exhausted young people can be seen being abandoned in the middle of the desert. There are also children. One of the testimonies states that they stayed for two days until they were found; another that they were beaten by Tunisian soldiers and taken to the desert, where they were told to cross into Libya. In July 2023, the EU signed with the stroke of a pen an agreement with the Tunisian government, backed by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, for Tunisia to block the sea crossings and speed up the return of those trying to reach Europe from its territory.

Outsourcing is neither new to the EU nor exclusive to Meloni. EUR 1 billion was agreed, in a pact similar to the one reached in 2016, with Turkey, for EUR 6 billion, where in addition to the money it was approved that Turkish citizens could travel to Europe without a visa. The same had previously been done with Gaddafi's Libya, which in a summit in Tripoli had asked for EUR 4 billion to prevent Europe 'going black'. Tunisia alone accounted for about 100,000 of the more than 151,000 arrivals recorded in 2023, of which about 80,000 came from other African countries. The iron wrist exhibited by Saied seems to have favoured these results. 'I don't think governments want people to die, but they are willing to accept that people suffer and die in exchange for them not arriving,' says Gonzalo Fanjul, researcher and research director of the PorCausa organisation. In this sense, 'Spain is applying the same crackdown of externalising migration control that it has applied for years,' Fanjul continues.

Tunisia alone accounted for around 100,000 of the more than 151,000 landings recorded in 2023, with a share of around 80,000 incoming migrants from other African countries. The iron thumb exhibited by Saied, fortified with over a billion from the EU, seems to have favoured those results that do not materialise with the offensive against NGOs and the design of an outsourcing of the reception process.

The practice of assigning distant ports

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The Meloni government's other battle concerns the rescue NGOs, which, according to Villa, 'have no evidence of contributing to the departures'. The inhibition of NGOs has been expressed in specific interventions, such as the so-called Piantedosi decree. The inhibition of NGOs has been expressed in specific interventions, such as the so-called Piantedosi decree: a text of law approved in January 2023 and 'containing urgent provisions for the management of migratory flows', an intervention that expresses itself on boats engaged in rescues off the Mediterranean coast.

The text obliges NGOs' vessels to "request, in the immediacy of the event, the assignment of the port of disembarkation" and to "reach the port of disembarkation indicated by the authorities without delay, in order to complete the rescue", coupled with a tried and tested practice: that of assigning particularly distant ports of call to the vessels in question, usually in northern Italy or on the Adriatic coast, with the result of prolonging the migrants' stay on board and thinning out the rescue activities of the organisations themselves. A practice with visible consequences for the NGOs "and above all for the rescued people, since more days of navigation than expected not only increase the costs of the missions and limit their possibilities of rescue, but also increase the suffering of already vulnerable people, delay access to services and the possibility of applying for international protection," explains Davide Giacomino of the advocacy office of Emergency, an Italian NGO founded in 1994 and also active in sea rescue activities.

Among the most recent cases are those of boats forced to dock in Genoa port after conducting a rescue in Libyan waters, as happened to the 'Geo Barents' of Médecins Sans Frontières in June 2024.

Sanchez's defence of expulsions and the number Meloni doesn't like to quote

During his three-country tour, in which he spoke about quotas, worker training and 'circular immigration' and investment promotion, such as the 'Africa Advances Alliance', presented in Dakar, Sanchez defended expulsions. "It is also essential to repatriate those who arrived in Spain irregularly," said the Spanish president, on the third stop of his African tour, in Senegal. "Especially because this repatriation sends a clear, sharp and strong message that discourages the mafias and those who put themselves in their hands," he said.

Paradoxically, Sánchez's announcement that made the most noise during his tour of Africa, that of formalising a legal quota for emigration to Spain for work reasons, is very similar to Meloni's less publicised strategy of promoting legal immigration. Through the so-called 'flows decree' (27/09/2023), one of the most right-wing forces in Italy's recent history has literally opened the doors to the entry of 452,000 foreign citizens for 'reasons of seasonal and non-seasonal employment and self-employment', divided between 136,000 in 2023, 151,000 in 2024 and 165,000 in 2025.

Other EU governments, such as Romania, have also established work permit quotas for non-EU foreigners to cope with labour shortages, in their case exacerbated by the more than five million Romanians outside their country. In Romania, these workers come mainly from Nepal, Sri Lanka and India, with quotas of 100,000 permits in 2023 and 140,000 in 2024. Even in Poland, where many of the jobs occupied by Ukrainians have been affected by the war, work permits for Asians and Latin Americans have skyrocketed to 275,000 in 2023, mainly for citizens from India, Nepal and the Philippines.

'We must have the courage to accept that the approach taken so far is a failure,' Fanjul says. 'We need a solid alternative in terms of legal and safe channels that responds both to the need for emigration from sub-Saharan African countries and to the need for immigration that we European countries have in the face of demographic winter,' he concludes.

*This article is part of the Pulse project and was written by Alberto Magnani (Il Sole 24 Ore, Italy), Lola García-Ajofrín (El Confidencial, Spain).

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  • Alberto Magnani

    Alberto MagnaniCorrispondente

    Luogo: Nairobi

    Lingue parlate: inglese, tedesco

    Argomenti: Lavoro, Unione europea, Africa

    Premi: Premio "Alimentiamo il nostro futuro, nutriamo il mondo. Verso Expo 2015" di Agrofarma Federchimica e Fondazione Veronesi; Premio giornalistico State Street, categoria "Innovation"

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