Cassation

No second surname if it damages the child's identity

The interests of the child must be protected in the event of late acknowledgement of paternity

by Camilla Curcio

28 August 2025

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5' min read

Key points

About the origins of the story
Tribunal and Court of Appeal guidance
Exclusive custody of a child
No to second surname
The final verdict

5' min read

The addition of the surname of the father who recognises the child after the mother is not automatic and can be denied if it risks harming the child. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Cassation, in its order 23905/2025, which rejected the appeal of a parent who, after a prolonged absence from his daughter's life, had asked to reconnect with her, claimingshared custody and the addition of her surname to her mother's.

Requests that were rejected in both first and second instance on the grounds of the man's lack of awareness of the child's needs and the lack of participation in bigenitorial courses and meetings promoted by the social services, were also sent back to the sender by the judges of legitimacy.

The origins of the story

The clash between the two parents on paternity triggered the legal tam tam tam. The child's father, in fact, had filed an appeal with the Court of Turin to obtain recognition (four years after the birth), but the ex-partner, although sure on the biological level, had put forward several doubts regarding the man's incapacity on the relational level: the green light could have had, according to her, a significant (and potentially risky) impact on the child's life, considering the discontinuous relationship she had had with her father up to that moment. Not only that: the woman also pleaded lack of territorial jurisdiction of the court. A claim that, if accepted, automatically shifted the management of the dispute to the Court of Ivrea.

In the second appeal, the child's mother no longer objected to the recognition but expressed misgivings about the request for shared custody of the child, reiterating that her ex-partner had not considered her daughter in any way until a few months before the trial. Not only that, she also claimed a maintenance allowance. But the waters did not calm down and the battle continued with new twists and turns: in a sudden change of strategy, the plaintiff, in fact, had gone so far as to question the paternity, claiming that the mother had refused to subject her daughter, as agreed, to a genetic test. Examination which, requested and carried out by the technical consultant, had confirmed in black and white the blood relationship first defended, then contested.

The orientation of the Court and the Court of Appeal

Having closed the bureaucratic procedures, the judges at first instance, therefore, confirmed the applicant's paternity, but recognised the mother's exclusive (or enhanced) custody of the child: she had the power to make decisions - exclusively and autonomously - on the child's upbringing, education, health and choice of residence. The father, on the other hand, had been provided with the tools to make up for lost time: if, in fact, he had expressed the will to re-enter the child's life, ensuring constant presence, he would have had to undertake a path of support for bigenitoriality and actively participate in meetings organised by the social services (with the involvement - if necessary - of a developmental psychologist, to offer the necessary support to the child).

And that's not all: the man should have actively contributed to the maintenance by paying a monthly allowance of 2,000 euro, annually revalued according to ISTAT indices, and by paying 50 per cent of the extraordinary expenses in the daughter's interest, provided that they are documented. A red light, however, for the integration of the second surname: not only the absence from the child's life and the inability to put her needs before one's own, but also the lack of cooperation in the initiatives set up to facilitate the rapprochement "with a view to a progressive autonomisation of the relationship and support to the parenting of both parties".

A package of reasons and evidence which, also confirmed by the Court of Appeal, reaches - through a further appeal - the judges of the Supreme Court.

Exclusive custody of the child

Before the Supreme Court the situation does not change. To corroborate the exclusive custody to the mother "the protection of the moral and material interests of the child" - which can often lead to measures that do not contemplate a balance and an equal division of the child's time between the two parents - and the demonstration of the unfitness of a father who, just at the beginning of the rapprochement, did not know his daughter well enough. Nor could he claim to have any influence over her life (according to the Court of Appeal's reconstructions, in fact, he had not seen the child - born in 2015 - since 2019 and for some periods had not even provided the obligatory maintenance).

The reasons given by the second instance judges excluded the appeal: a relationship that was too immature to support the child's development; a still poor knowledge of her needs; the need to respect her timing and personality; the absence of dialogue with her ex-partner, given also unpleasant precedents with disparaging and insulting behaviour towards her. As well as a lack of clarity in the management of the relationship.

The personal ambition of the applicant who, having returned to see the child four years after her birth, wanted to reunite all his children (including the male child born to his ex-wife) in a large family, including his new partner and her child, clashes with the reality of the facts. And with the need, according to the Court of Cassation, to "understand that one's personal project must respect the child's time and needs, as well as take into account the fact that a custody arrangement other than the current one, even if exclusive, requires a capacity for constructive relationship with the other parent for the adoption of choices of greater importance".

The no to the second surname

A complicated and not very encouraging scenario which, evidently, also puts at stake the second request, that of a second surname. Once again, the father's 'absconding' from the child's life, the lack of cooperation at meetings organised by the social services and the persistent shortcomings weigh heavily.

The law does not prevent integration but a series of requirements must be met. Article 262 of the Civil Code guarantees, in fact, the parent - who belatedly recognises paternity - the possibility of adding the second surname "provided that it does not cause prejudice to the child by reason of the parent's bad reputation and is not detrimental to the child's personal identity where this has already been consolidated, with the use of the first surname, in the web of personal and social relations".

In the present case, the father figure was not yet sufficiently involved in his daughter's life. Who, moreover, being nine years old, had also long since begun schooling identifying herself with her mother's surname. Any registry change could have produced - given and considering, of course, the precarious relational context - risky consequences. And it is up to the judge - again - to give priority to the child's interests, excluding any automaticity.

The final verdict

Therefore, net of the recognition of paternity, the ermines deny the child's father shared custody and the supplementary attribution of his surname to the maternal one. Moreover, they confirm the payment of the maintenance allowance, the coverage of extraordinary expenses (to be documented) in the daughter's interest and the payment of the litigation expenses (3 thousand euro for compensation and 200 euro for disbursements).