Space

Beijing challenges Washington for the race to the Moon

Scheduled to launch this year to the space south pole with the aim of taking astronauts to the Earth satellite in 2030

by Leopoldo Benacchio

7 May 2026

Il razzo Lunga Marcia 2 F usato per raggiungere la stazione spaziale cinese

3' min read

Translated by AI

Versione italiana

Key points

This year's launch to the south pole
Launch record
The orbital spaceplane

3' min read

Translated by AI

Versione italiana

On 17 February, the great Chinese New Year ceremony-show was held in Beijing, opening what, according to that calendar, is the Year of the Horse. During the spectacle, suspended between tradition and the future, the scenes in the sky constructed with swarms of drones were particularly striking. Among these, one did not go unnoticed in which a taikonauta, i.e. a Chinese astronaut, and the moon goddess Chang'e appeared together. A very clear message: this, for China, also wants to be the year of space.

Such an allusion is worth a thousand words and confirms that Beijing is indeed aiming at the Moon, as well as wanting to consolidate space as a national strategic infrastructure, combining scientific, industrial, military and geopolitical prestige objectives. The competition with the United States is increasingly evident. The 2026 calendar, packed with launches, experiments and initiatives, shows how the country of the Dragon aims to become the space power of reference in Asia and a concrete alternative to the West for many emerging countries.

At the centre of the plan is the Tiangong space station, the 'Heavenly Palace', which is now in full swing and for which two manned missions and one cargo mission are planned. Experiments in microgravity, space medicine and the development of new materials are planned. China is also aiming to broaden consensus and interest around Tiangong by selecting astronauts from the special territories of Hong Kong and Macao and including a Pakistani astronaut.

This year's launch to the south pole

The hottest point in the programme, however, remains the Moon. Chang'e-7 is scheduled to be launched to the lunar south pole in 2026, supported by the Queqiao-2 relay satellite for communications from the most difficult area of our satellite. The mission is complex and ambitious: it envisages a lunar orbiter, a lander, a rover for surface exploration and also a small vehicle capable of penetrating permanently shadowed craters in search of water ice, the true holy grail for a future lunar base.

It is worth mentioning that China has so far been the only one to successfully carry out a similar operation on the hidden side of the Moon with Chang'e-6, and also managed to land on Mars on the first attempt. That is no small feat.

2026 will also see the maiden flight of the new Long March 10A launcher, followed by the first tests of the Mengzhou manned capsule and a combined mission by the end of the year. If these goals are met, the 2030 target set by Beijing to bring Chinese astronauts to the Moon will remain technically credible.

Record of launches

Then there is the launch figure. For 2026, Beijing expects around 140 missions, between those conducted by the state space apparatus and those entrusted to the private sector, although the term 'private' in China should be taken with caution. This is a very high number, even compared to the 68 launches in 2025, but still lower than the 165 of SpaceX, which continues to dominate the Western market. Also in China, the growth in the number of launches is linked to the development of constellations for Earth observation, telecommunications and internet access from space on a national scale, a tool considered crucial for a country with such a vast and articulated territory.

Of course, it is not all doom and gloom. China suffers from a lack of certain leading electronics components, which could be embargoed in the future: for instance, advanced chips produced in the US or radiation-resistant electronics, which are crucial for space missions. In addition, the lack of transparency on certain dual-use capabilities, such as orbital inspection or anti-satellite systems, fuels the distrust of other powers, who themselves are not very transparent.

In 2026, the competition with Washington will shift not only to the lunar south pole, but also to low orbit, in an overall context made more dangerous by the lack of shared international norms and two very different cultural approaches. On the one hand there are the Artemis Accords, which Nasa interprets in a way that is often strongly centred on US interests; on the other there is the Chinese offer of a space presented as more accessible to non-aligned countries.

The Orbital Space Plane

Development also continues on the Shenlong reusable orbital spaceplane, which appears to have similar characteristics to the US X-37B military spaceplane. These are, in essence, orbital transporters for satellites, instruments and equipment, with in-orbit stays of hundreds of days and autonomous landing capabilities. On both systems, however, information remains very limited because they are programmes covered by military secrecy.

The Chinese space plan for 2026, therefore, is not just a list of missions, but a true strategic statement of intent, destined to weigh in on one of the most important fronts in the systemic competition between Beijing and Washington.