Open and closed VAT numbers increasingly in the crosshairs with risk analysis

VAT fraud remains a hub to be closely monitored in order to guard against evasion phenomena that can then spill over into other types of taxes. Value added tax remains a special watchdog to flush out or foresee forms of malfeasance in taxation and beyond. Hence a growing attention to the phenomenon of so-called 'open and close', i.e. the instrumental use of bogus VAT positions to issue non-existent invoices in order to allow the beneficiaries of the fraud (the so-called brokers) to gain advantages also in terms of acquiring tax credits, as so many cases of criminal designs brought to light with the scams related to credit assignments on building concessions have taught us. This is why risk analysis, on which a task force (the Upar) between the Revenue Agency and the Guardia di Finanza has also been set up, comes into play.

The synergy between the central and local structures of the Revenue Agency aims at an increasingly targeted selection capacity of the subjects deemed most dangerous. A selection capable of producing its results not only in the control phase but also in the issuance of new VAT numbers, thus reconstructing any previous history of applicants. But, as mentioned above, the objective is not only to inhibit unlawful behaviour in the future by means of VAT number termination measures. In fact, intelligence activity also presupposes the ability to trace the entire fraudulent chain, if it has been set up, and thus identify the final recipients. In this context, the activation of investigative synergies with the Guardia di Finanza becomes strategic.

Then there is the vigilance, now always at a very high level, over the phenomenon of bogus habitual exporters. A status that offers the advantage of buying or importing goods or services without applying VAT. In this way, fraud generates a double negative effect: both in terms of revenue for the Treasury and in terms of the dumping that is generated on the market against regular operators. Hence the increasingly stringent recourse to the potential offered by databases with the possibility of nipping offences in the bud through a procedure of automatic blocking of false letters of intent and timely communication to suppliers.

In this vein also goes the tightening launched with the decree implementing the tax delegation on tax assessment (Legislative Decree 13/2024) concerning the phenomenon of VAT evasion from abroad on e-commerce platforms. In particular, the decree has provided for an obligation of a guarantee that non-EU operators will have to deposit if they use tax representatives to make intra-Community purchases and sales. Added to this are more stringent requirements for representatives, such as not having been convicted (even if not final) of financial crimes and not having committed serious and repeated violations of tax and contribution provisions. Not to mention the need to verify the truthfulness and completeness of the documents produced by the taxpayer in order not to risk an administrative penalty of between EUR 3,000 and EUR 50,000.