Economic Policy

GDP per capita, Italy catches up with France Closing the gap with Berlin

Macroeconomics. Post-Covid growth effects in updated EU data 1.1% above Eurozone average, but still far below 2000 levels

by Gianni Trovati

Il confronto. Secondo la Commissione Ue (nella foto Palazzo Berlaymont a Bruxelles) l’Italia eguaglia la Francia nel Pil pro capite. (EPA/Olivier Hoslet)

4' min read

4' min read

In the global panorama shaken by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and by the winds of a neo-protectionism that even before the concrete application of duties is splitting the consolidated routes of globalisation, the Eurozone's economic prospects outlined on Monday by the EU Commission's spring forecasts are not exciting. And even less so are those attributed to Italy, which with its +0.7% growth for this year and the +0.9% forecast for 2026 (official government estimates speak instead of +0.6% and +0.8%) would travel respectively two and five decimals below the average pace kept by the countries of the single currency.

But alongside the macro forecasts, which are difficult to carve into the marble when they have to venture into scenarios shot through with bursts of political announcements that are not always rational, it is the granular data processed by the Brussels technicians that offer the most interesting insights. Which, for those who are not too keen to venture into the dense jungle of data and tables, can be summarised as follows: Italy's post-pandemic recovery has achieved important results, especially when one looks at the per capita GDP at purchasing power parity, which measures the economy's performance net of the blows dealt by demographics and inflation in different ways from state to state. In this area, for example, Italy has now evened the score with France, erasing a gap in per capita GDP that was 10.1% in 2020 and 8.8% in 2015; it has almost halved the 'spread' with Germany, which has gone from 24.3% to 13.9% in five years; and it has mended relations with the Eurozone average, from which it is separated by 5.9% instead of the 10.7% in 2020 and the 9.4% recorded in 2015 (all obviously measured on the current borders of the single currency). These figures are not trivial, even if they are the result of a comparison with an area that, starting with Germany, certainly does not stand out for its lively growth.

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A strong push has come from the increase in employment, which has set records in the last two years but, the data suggest, is limping along in the specific weight summarised by the amount of output per person employed. And, the last but crucial chapter of the summary, the road that should be taken to recover the damage generated by the long pre-pandemic stagnation is still a long one; because the economic weight (and therefore the relative well-being) achieved by Italy 25, 20 or just 15 years ago is still a long way off.

The numbers, then. The most encouraging ones, it was said, come from calculations on GDP per inhabitant. Which have a merit, because they sterilise the impacts of a demographic dynamic that is even more icy than in the rest of the area. But they also have a flaw: since the public debt, on which Italy is by far the record-holder among the continent's large countries and already sees the lead in the overall ranking with Greece soon to be overtaken, is sustained by the revenue generated by the overall product, regardless of how many people are involved.

In the count based on purchasing power parity standards, Italy's GDP has not only recovered its pre-Covid European positioning, but has also surpassed by a whisker the conditions of 2015, when it was in line with the Eurozone average now exceeded by 1.1%. In addition to regaining French levels and almost halving the gap with Germany, this indicator plays a complicated race with Spain, which in recent years is among the queens of European growth: in 2025 each Italian is 'owner' of a domestic product 6.2% higher than that of each Spaniard, ten years ago the distance was marginally smaller (+5.9%) but in 2020, the year of the collapse of the economy of both countries, it was 13.1%.

The picture becomes much bleaker, however, when the historical series is extended. Italy's product per inhabitant, which is now worth 5.9% less than the Eurozone average, was instead close to that of the single currency area until 2010 (-2.5%), was in line in 2005, and significantly higher in 2000 (+7.6%).

The parabola is the fruit of the twenty-year stagnation that between 2000 and 2019, with governments of all shapes and colours, nailed our average real growth rate to a dull 0.38%, and that after the 2011 crisis only saw it exceed +1% in 2015 and 2016. The stagnation has dried up the continental weight of the Italian economy, which in 2000 was worth 18.9% of the Eurozone and then fell to an all-time low of 15.3% in 2020, before the small recovery that brought it to 15.7% this year. Here the match with France is far from being won, because from a near-break-even 25 years ago we have gone to -14.4% this year (but the distance was 17.3% in 2015 and 21% in 2020) while Madrid is coming close: 25 years ago Spain produced 76.6% less than Italy, today the delta has shrunk by almost three times to 26.9%.

The productivity engine, summarised by the average GDP per employee and fuelled by organisation, investments, technologies and process innovations, has died out. In 2000, the typical Italian worker generated a GDP 18.2 per cent higher than the average colleague in the euro area, and in the first two decades of the century this ratio declined steadily until it reversed in the 1.1 per cent recorded in 2020.

On this ground too, the lens focused on the most recent years returns positive dynamics, but less brilliant than those drawn by the per capita product: compared to Paris, the GDP produced on average by each worker is 2.1% lower in Italy (it was 9% lower in 2020 and 6.3% lower in 2015), and the Italian performance is slightly better than the overall performance of the euro area (+1.1%) to which, however, it was already aligned in recent years. This is a sign that employment is growing more than GDP, and is concentrated in sectors whose added value is not able to unlock the packed engine of productivity.

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