EU Court

Religious body cannot dismiss those who deny the faith

It must be proven that religious affiliation is an essential requirement. Otherwise the employer's decision amounts to direct discrimination

by Giampiero Falasca

18 March 2026

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3' min read

Translated by AI

Versione italiana

3' min read

Translated by AI

Versione italiana

European Union law does not allowa Catholic religious body to dismiss an employee simply because he or she has left the Church, unless it is shown, in a concrete and verifiable manner, that the denominational affiliation is an essential requirement, legitimate and proportionate in relation to the duties performed. This is the principle that emerges from the judgment of the European Court of Justice of 17 March 2026 (Case C-258/24), concerning the relationship between a Catholic consultancy firm and an employee who, in the course of her employment, had decided to leave the Church.

The organisation, whose identity is founded on religious values, had deemed the choice incompatible with the continuation of the relationship, even though it did not generally impose denominational membership as a requirement for employment and in the absence of behaviour publicly contrary to the doctrine.

The German court therefore referred the question to the Court of Justice as to whether a national law that makes it possible to make continued employment conditional on the preservation - or even re-acquisition - of church membership is compatible with Directive 2000/78/EC, read in the light of Articles 10 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Essential Religious Requirement

The EU Court starts from the assumption that the dismissal integrates direct discrimination based on religion, as it exclusively affects employees who have left the Church. The legal crux is therefore the balancing act between religious freedom and the organisational autonomy of trendy bodies and the prohibition of discrimination in employment.

Article 4(2) of the directive allows religious organisations to introduce differences in treatment, but only when the religious requirement is essential, legitimate and justified, according to cumulative criteria and subject to judicial review. In particular, there must be a direct and objectively verifiable link between the requirement imposed and the work activity, and the employer must demonstrate that the risk of prejudice to its ethics is real and serious.

The orientation of the EU Court

In the present case, the Court recognises that pregnancy counselling (carried out by the employer) may, in principle, have a connection with the ethics of the organisation. However, this connection cannot be presumed generally, but must be demonstrated by reference to the specific job position. Moreover, the Court notes that similar positions were also entrusted to employees not belonging to the Catholic Church, a circumstance that excludes the essential character of the requirement. Nor can the abandonment of the Church be automatically qualified as violation of the obligation of loyalty towards the employer, in the absence of evidence of a concrete impact on the activity carried out.

It follows that the dismissal can be considered compatible with European Union law only if there is a direct, concrete and proven link between religious affiliation and the duties, as well as the essential and proportionate nature of the requirement. In the absence of those conditions, the measure constitutes prohibited discrimination.

The ruling thus consolidates a principle of balance valid not only for the specific case but for all confessional organisations: the religious freedom of organisations, while guaranteed, encounters a limit in the right of workers not to be discriminated against. It is not sufficient to refer in the abstract to the confessional identity of the organisation, but a rigorous and verifiable justification is required, which prevents this identity from being transformed into an expulsion power detached from the concrete requirements of the work activity. Generally speaking, it is not excluded that the reasoning of the EU Court may also be valid for other types of purpose organisations.