Russian hackers target Tajani’s family: his wife’s and children’s mobile phones appear on the dark web

But this time there is one factor that changes the scale of the operation. The Tajani family do not hold the minister’s institutional posts. Yet they are being exposed in the very same digital space used to profile magistrates, investigators and European security officials. The line between political attack and personal intimidation is thus shifting to the deputy prime minister’s innermost circle.

The publication of the data follows a message that NoName posted specifically about Tajani on its Telegram channel. It consists of a long series of attacks, provocations and personal jibes, in which the collective once again threatens the people on its list.

“Anyone who has found themselves, or will find themselves, on this ‘hall of fame’ must accept that sooner or later the ‘reward’ will catch up with them. It’s only a matter of time,” the hackers write.

The target is the Foreign Secretary, sarcastically dubbed ‘Antosha’. NoName attacks him for the positions he has taken on Ukraine, mocks some of his public statements and accuses him of making decisions that are out of touch with reality. He then moves on to the warnings: ‘We have facial recognition here. We carefully select our “clients” (…) everyone is responsible for their own actions.’

The tone changes again when the hackers delve into the minister’s family life. They refer to a photograph posted on social media, which shows the Tajani family’s new dog. ‘We’re glad your family has got a new dog; you look very happy in the photo,’ they write. And they suggest he retires, goes for walks in the park and spends time with his wife.

The case against Tajani is not an isolated one. The same ‘Tribunal’ already includes the Rome Public Prosecutor, Francesco Lo Voi, and senior figures involved in the fight against cybercrime. The list also includes European officials from Eurojust and Europol, organisations involved in international operations against cybercriminal organisations.

People who, by virtue of the roles they hold, directly represent the institutions against which NoName is waging its campaign. Now, however, the collective is extending its surveillance to include those who do not hold any public office but share a private life with one of its main political targets.

The danger goes beyond the publication of the data. Having access to personal telephone numbers means being able to contact the individuals concerned directly, subject them to harassment, attempt targeted scams or use their details for further cyber-attacks. This does not, of course, prove that such actions have already taken place.

Above all, the question remains as to the source of the numbers. If they had in fact been purchased, it would mean that there is also a network operating around the NoName list that is capable of obtaining and selling personal information.