Geopolitics

Space, Germany turns the tables on European security

The German government has earmarked 35 billion to improve early warning of attacks and provide the army with launching capabilities

by Leopoldo Benacchio

28 May 2026

4' min read

Translated by AI

Versione italiana

Key points

German language partners
What are the real possibilities for innovation?
What role for the European Space Agency?
Satellite constellation

4' min read

Translated by AI

Versione italiana

Germany definitely takes the initiative in the military field with an allocation of no less than EUR 135 billion, more than 3% of its budget. For the space part, and this is an absolute first, it allocates 35 billion until 2030. The plan aims to strengthen cybersecurity, improve early warning of attacks, increase the redundancy of constellations, and ensure more secure and flexible launch capabilities for the Bundeswehr, the German army.

Overall, it is therefore a decisive field choice and not a technological upgrade: the intention is to build a complete national space security architecture, giving Berlin more autonomy to share with the German-speaking countries, as Defence Minister Pistorius stated at a recent press conference. One also has to wonder how the position of the European Space Agency, ESA, will change with this strong decision by its most important contributor.

German-speaking partners

The German decision reaffirms the importance of 'domain space', initially thought important only for observation of theatres of operation, but now considered essential across the board: observation and deterrence, communications, intelligence and intervention.

Germany has also proposed to its German-speaking partners, Austria, Switzerland and Lichtenstein, the establishment of a Joint Operating Centre for military satellites. The intention is also to invest in the diversification of launch capabilities, taking advantage of national companies that are trying to enter the service sector for relatively small satellites. Isar Aerospace, Rocket Factory Augsburg and HyImpulse, which are close to achieving good operational results in the launch sector, would provide the industrial base mainly related to space security aspects.

Obviously, above these, we find OHB, which already contributed to the SAR-Lupe programmes, the small German military radar constellation for military surveillance, now decommissioned, and SARah, which replaced its predecessor. Certainly, the other two aerospace giants Airbus and Rheinmetall will be part of the supply chain that will build the new military satellite constellations.

What are the real possibilities for innovation?

There are also criticisms of the German rearmament plan as a whole: according to a report by the authoritative Kiel Institute, Germany will spend a lot by investing in a technologically 'old' way, without developing autonomous systems, artificial intelligence and truly innovative platforms. The risk, in essence, is that the great financial effort will result in a relative benefit, investing in industrial and military models that are out of date and do not take into account the events of recent years.

In the space sector, the danger is, by its very nature, much less, but even here one has to consider the consolidated European mentality that looks at the value of orders and not at the ability to integrate innovation, speed of development and construction, which are fundamental in the military field, as well as the dual use of satellites.

What role for the European Space Agency?

This is a delicate point, which carries over into European coordination as a whole and the role of ESA, the European Space Agency, of which Berlin is the largest contributor with over five billion, spread over several years. The figure represents 23% of the agency's entire budget, while France, around 16.5%, and Italia, 15.7%, contribute almost on a par.

Esa's geographic return policy means that in these three countries almost all the investment in Esa is reinvested directly in the national aerospace industry. An excellent thing, of course, but one that over time has introduced considerable rigidity, the enemy of agility in decision-making, speed of implementation and, ultimately, the ability to innovate: European launchers, which are excellent but not as reusable as SpaceX's, are less economical and are the best example. Germany, which is also predominant in the Agency's leadership, would seem to strengthen Esa with this military space plan, even if not directly, since national investments of this magnitude induce more industrial capacity and more technological development. One might also think that, at a time when dependence on non-European technologies seems increasingly difficult to bear, Berlin could help Esa member states to break out of this constraint.

Satellite Constellation

Others, perhaps more realistically, see the risk of weakening the role of the ESA, which already has to chase and finance many national initiatives, e.g. in France, Sweden, Spain, that want to develop medium-small launchers, for which, it is assumed, the European market will soon be in demand, given the large number of national satellite constellations planned.

One such constellation, envisaged in the new German plan, is precisely a kind of Germanic Starlink, the need for which Ukraine itself has suggested. The move seems a kind of cloning of the 'good practices' cherished by the EU, and it would be hoped that it would go even further.

Esa, by statute, cannot concern itself with the military side and, in this scenario, could well remain central in the major civil, scientific and space access programmes, but gradually lose influence in the more strategic and innovative choices.

Perhaps presenting this possibility, Josef Aschbacher, Esa Director General, said in an interview at the Globsec forum in Prague in recent days: 'If we don't make big changes, we will never be able to keep up with the US'. It would suffice to add 'and China'.