Business

The false apocalypse of AI and the real systemic risk

Panic over software titles stems from an error of perspective: confusing cognitive capacity and institutional coordination

by Biagio Simonetta

2' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

2' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

Between 28 January and 13 February 2026, more than USD 2 trillion of capitalisation evaporated from the enterprise software sector. This is the figure that Andrea Pignataro, founder and CEO of ION Group, starts from in his talk 'The Wrong Apocalypse' . Triggering the sell-off were the new plugins of Anthropic's Claude Cowork and the advancement of Claude Code, tools that showed how an artificial intelligence system is now capable of drafting legal documents, managing accounting flows and automating tasks typical of structured cognitive work. In more brutal words: how an AI system can replace much of the software we have known and used for years.

The market reaction was linear: if an AI agent can do what software does, that software becomes superfluous. Reinforcing this reading was Dario Amodei's essay, The Adolescence of Technology, which hypothesises a 'country of geniuses in a data centre' capable of disrupting employment and economic structures.

Loading...

Pignataro argues that this interpretation hits the wrong target. The mistake lies in confusing capability and coordination. Enterprise software, he argues, does not serve primarily to perform cognitive tasks, but to coordinate cognitive work between different actors, with shared rules, authorisations, traceability, standards. It is an institutional infrastructure before being technological. Replacing a management system is not the same as replacing a function: it means rewriting the 'language' with which an organisation operates.

This is where Wittgenstein's notion of a 'language game' comes in: companies do not simply use Salesforce or an ERP, they talk through those platforms. Processes, metrics and hierarchies are embedded in the software. Therefore, according to Pignataro, erosion will mainly affect the more 'commodity' layer of software, while solutions that are deeply embedded in organisational processes will be more resilient.

The biggest risk, however, is not the rapid replacement of tools. It is the paradox whereby each firm, by adopting AI to remain competitive, helps to train the platform that could disintermediate it. Through aggregate and longitudinal patterns, platforms learn the 'grammar' of entire sectors: consulting, legal, insurance, financial advisory. No proprietary data is exposed, but the structure of work is. The result is a tragedy of the commons dynamic: rational individual decisions produce a collectively destructive outcome.

If this trajectory were to unfold all the way, the impact would not stop at software. It would hit professional services, commercial real estate, business travel, venture capital, urban tax bases. And the 2 trillion burnt would only be a down payment. Compensation through robotics and physical automation would happen in industrial time, while cognitive destruction would travel at digital speed.

In this context, European regulatory fragmentation - often seen as a brake, especially overseas - could act as a useful friction, slowing the propagation of the shock between sectors.

The central question, Pignataro concludes, is not so much whether AI can do what software does. But what happens when the institutions that adopt it discover they have taught it to play their own game without them. The answer will depend on the cumulative choices of millions of companies over the next decade.

Copyright reserved ©
Loading...

Brand connect

Loading...

Newsletter

Notizie e approfondimenti sugli avvenimenti politici, economici e finanziari.

Iscriviti