Trump's turnaround and the security of Europe

Sooner or later, the knots come to the comb. And the knot in question, for Europe, is called security. After France suspended the process of approving the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty on 30 August 1954, the task of ensuring the security of our continent was subcontracted to the United States through its (military and technological) leadership of NATO. A sub-contract that was reconfirmed in the post-Cold War period, when Europeans thought the story was over. Then came Putin, with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, showing that the story was far from over. Again, it was NATO that resisted him, as the Europeans continued to lack the resources and institutions to protect Ukraine (and themselves). However, with the electoral changes in Washington D.C., NATO's security role is no longer a foregone conclusion.

In an interview with NBC a few days ago, Donald Trump reiterated the position he maintained throughout the election campaign. American military aid to Ukraine will be reduced, American involvement in NATO will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, the Russian-Ukrainian war is a European affair, it will be up to the Europeans to guarantee a ceasefire between the two countries, as well as to bear the enormous costs of the economic and civil reconstruction of Ukraine. Tasks (and this is the crux of the matter) that the Europeans are unable to fulfil unless they change their integrative 'paradigm'.

There is no doubt that the European Union (EU) has done much to help Ukraine. Between February 2022 and June 2024, it approved 14 economic sanctions packages against Russia (and a further package is currently under discussion). In the context of the European Peace Facility (an intergovernmental financial vehicle), it provided lethal weapons to the Ukrainian army through the military assistance programme (EUMAN Ukraine), as well as increased the production of ammunition to be transferred to the Kiev government through a regulation (Act in Support of Ammunition Production) passed in July 2023. It boosted defence industrial production (with the European Defence Industrial Strategy or EDIS) of March 2024. To help Ukraine economically, it increased the European Peace Facility fund from EUR 5.6 billion to EUR 17 billion, introduced (for 2023 only) the EUR 18 billion Macro-Financial Assistance Instrument for Ukraine (MFA+), and, for the period 2024-2027, passed a regulation establishing the EUR 50 billion Ukraine Facility (UF), of which 1/3 is grants and the rest loans. In addition, individual EU member states have signed bilateral agreements with the Ukrainian government through which they transfer arms and aid. Considering the EU's abulic reaction to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the same cannot be said for the reaction to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

While the EU has done a lot, it has not done enough. Europeans remain militarily and technologically dependent on the United States, a country that has become unpredictable. There is no European defence capability independent of the 27 EU member states, so that decision-making on it is continually paralysed by inter-state divisions within the EU. There is no EU strategic vision on conflicts that also dramatically affect its member states. The EU is absent in Middle Eastern conflicts (in Gaza, Syria), even though the consequences of those conflicts will be felt exclusively by its member states (through migratory flows, demands for protection, terrorist risks). A strategic vision that is also absent in the war in Ukraine. Hungary, which will chair the Council of Ministers until 31 December 2024, acts as an appendage of the Russian Federation. Poland, which will take its place in the next six months, promises to change its perspective by resurrecting the so-called Weimar Triangle (a cooperation agreement between Poland, Germany and France signed in 1991), as if this were sufficient to counter Putin's imperial ambitions. The von der Leyen Commission has a defence commissioner (Andrius Kubilius) to promote transnational military industrial projects, but each member state primarily defends its own interests. If it comes to fruition, the increase of military spending to 3% of GDP will follow a national logic, with associated waste and overlaps. The EU does not have a supranational military apparatus to be activated in emergencies. Even the goal set in the March 2022 Strategic Compass, to create a 5000-strong EU rapid reaction force by 2025, is far from being achieved. If it succeeds in mobilising the 40,000 soldiers that are supposed to guarantee the eventual ceasefire between the Russians and Ukrainians, they will answer to the various national commands, with the idiosyncrasies that follow.

In short, it is not true that the EU has done little to help Ukraine, but it is true that it has not done enough. There is a need to change the integration paradigm, recognising that there are tasks (such as security) that cannot be performed by individual member states or their coordination. A debate has been launched for a return to the EDC. Good. One step backwards to make two steps forwards.