Towards European defence backed by European spending
The Union will have to make systemic choices that look at technology, skills and infrastructure
by Massimo Amato and Rosalba Famà
2' min read
2' min read
The Russian-Ukrainian war and the conflict in the Middle East have brought back to the centre of the debate the strategic issue of common defence, with which the new European Commission and the member states will have to deal. The overall geopolitical context and the need for Europe to have its own voice should push the EU to outline a more autonomous strategy.
Meanwhile, NATO has set its members a target on defence spending of 2% of GDP by 2028. Some EU countries, including Germany and Italy, will struggle to reach this target. Both the economic slowdown and the return to the Maastricht parameters are weighing on them. European fiscal rules have recently been reformed, but with little courage and foresight. This will entail a readjustment of national public finances, which exploded in past years in order to cope with the health emergency.
With this in mind, we are expecting finance laws in which, in order to make ends meet, a substantial investment in defence would result in spending cuts in other sectors, particularly welfare. Hence the case for a European defence financed with European resources. A goal that is far from impossible, if there is political agreement.
The Lisbon Treaty can kick-start the process. Article 24 TEU speaks explicitly of 'the progressive framing of a common defence policy that may lead to a common defence', albeit with the counterbalance of relevant constitutional guarantees: unanimity in the European Council and the approval of national parliaments. Moreover, in the financial architecture of the European Union a budget for defence expenditure, both administrative and operational, is expressly provided for.
Common defence is a natively European public good, which is why it should be financed with Community debt to be repaid with genuinely European resources. Otherwise, financing defence at the level of individual member states, as at present, entails more problems than advantages. Firstly, because common defence is not the sum of defence spending, but its overall reorganisation, in order to avoid both technological and military inefficiencies and duplication of expenditure. Moreover, centralising the financing of expenditure would avoid burdening the finances of individual states, which are already under stress. The recent initiatives of the EIB (European Investment Bank) to support defence and security financing are a first timid step.
