International Criminal Court: Trump tightens the noose – President Akane also sanctioned

But this is only part of the story. In 2020, the ICC authorised an investigation into alleged crimes committed during the conflict in Afghanistan, including possible liability on the part of US personnel. This precedent had reignited a fear deeply rooted in American politics long before Trump: that an international tribunal to which Washington has never acceded might try US citizens.

This, after all, is the legal crux of the dispute. The US is not a party to the Rome Statute – the treaty establishing the ICC – nor are Israel, Russia and China, and they dispute that the Court can exercise jurisdiction over their citizens without their consent. The Hague, on the other hand, maintains that it can do so, in certain circumstances, when the alleged crimes have been committed on the territory of a State that recognises its authority.

Trump has turned this long-standing mistrust into a systematic offensive. Following Khan, sanctions were imposed on the judges Solomy Balungi Bossa, Luz del Carmen Ibáñez Carranza, Reine Alapini-Gansou and Beti Hohler were sanctioned for decisions relating to Afghanistan and the proceedings concerning Israel. Next came the judges Kimberly Prost and Nicolas Yann Guillou, the assistant prosecutors Nazhat Shameem Khan and Mame Mandiaye Niang, and, finally, Gocha Lordkipanidze and Erdenebalsuren Damdin.

By that point, however, the nature of the dispute had already changed. According to an official interviewed on condition of anonymity by Reuters, the administration was indeed calling for a halt to proceedings against Israeli leaders, but also for the definitive closure of the case concerning US personnel in Afghanistan and guarantees against any possible future action against Trump and other US officials. In the background loomed an even more serious threat: to impose sanctions directly on the ICC.

Such a measure could have affected the very workings of the Court itself, from its dealings with banks to the payment of salaries, right through to contracts with suppliers. The strength of US sanctions, after all, lies precisely in their ability to have an impact outside the United States: the central role of the dollar and the US market leads foreign banks and companies to avoid those targeted, so as not to jeopardise their own relations with Washington.

Trump has denied that the campaign against the ICC is intended to protect himself, stating that his main objective is to defend Netanyahu and other Israeli officials. At present, there are no ICC proceedings against the president.

Meanwhile, the offensive has also taken on a diplomatic dimension. In July, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced his intention to urge other countries to distance themselves from the ICC, arguing that in future American military personnel and officials involved in migration policies or operations against vessels suspected of carrying drugs could find themselves in the Court’s sights.

The battle has also reached the US courts. In June, three judges from the Court filed a lawsuit against Trump and his administration, arguing that the sanctions are unlawful and are intended to punish them for their decisions.

And for the CPI, this is already a delicate moment. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have initiated procedures to withdraw from the Rome Statute, whilst Washington is openly seeking to persuade other countries to distance themselves from The Hague.

Finally, there remains a contradiction that has long characterised the relationship between Washington and international justice. Although, as mentioned, the United States has never ratified the Rome Statute and disputes the ICC’s jurisdiction over its own citizens, this has not prevented them from supporting the Court’s actions when they coincided with their own interests, as in the case of the investigations into crimes committed during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.