Ukraine, Palestine, Iran, Greenland: how Europeans feel at risk

The fear of a global danger is, on the other hand, there in the case of the war in Ukraine, here the fear touches 68 per cent of Germans, 56 per cent of the French, to 47 per cent of Italians (English at 52 per cent, Danish at 50 per cent). This widespread feeling of alertness strongly urges people to place themselveson positions of neutrality even in the case of Ukraine, which is judged as the nearest danger. The Germans, for example, although among the most alarmed, when asked about a possible involvement of their country have no doubts: 63% say no, followed by the Italians (55), the French and British (44) and finally the Danes (39). The percentages increase in the case of Israel: 72% of the Germans do not want to be involved, 65% of the British, 62% of the Danes, 61 of the Italians, 58 of the French.

While they drop noticeably when it comes to Greenland. And if it goes without saying that only one in 10 Danes would remain neutral, it is nevertheless less obvious the interventionism of the French: 56% of them opt for a French involvement (could the recent visit to the Elysée Palace by the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, and the Prime Minister of Greenland, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, have counted?). As well as the British (55%), perhaps given the hypothesis that is beginning to circulate of a return to the EU for the United Kingdom; more 'distant' are the Italians (39%) and Germans (40%).

Putting these responses against the light, a picture emerges that is perhaps not immediate but clear. Paradoxically (given that the tension is currently all diplomatic) it is the Greenlandic crisis that is judged to be the most 'European'. It is true that with regard to Ukraine and the Middle East the perceived fear is linked to the economic consequences (85% of Italians, 87 of the French, 90 of the Germans, 85 of the British and 81 of the Danes fear the economic impact) more than to a military offensive - and this is confirmed by the neutrality figure. But when it comes to the island's fate, old spectres seem to re-emerge, to the point of questioning the pacifist principle on which post-World War II Europe was born. An apprehension that has a direct effect on two crucial questions: does the United States still remain an ally of Europe? And in the management of these crises, what identity does Europe discover for itself? Well, on the first issue the axis that still seems to resist is the Anglo-American one. The US is a reliable partner for one Englishman in two, and if the Germans still believe in it (48%), the French are a little less convinced (44), the Italians are in doubt (38), and the Danes are not at all sure (22). Incidentally, the Italians (46%), if we exclude the Danes (59%), are the most confident in Europe that the US is an ally that considers above all its own interests.

As for the question of pro-Europeanism, despite everything the crises are not agreeing with the most extreme advocates of disintegration. The share of those who fear it is indeed a minority, ranging from being nothing in Denmark (5%), to being little more than nothing in Germany (14%), to being very small in Italy and France (19%). What deserves reasoning is certainly the relevant percentage in all countries of those who register divisions, but also a specific case: the set of answers of the British who seem to be moving towards an overcoming of the Brexit. Because not only do barely 10% of the British believe in fragmentation, but if we add up those who now consider Europe more united (35%) with those who do not see any change (18%), those who see it divided (37%) are decidedly outnumbered (53%).