Von der Leyen and centralist leadership

After the upcoming hearings in the European Parliament, the von der Leyen 2 Commission will take office, barring any surprises, at the beginning of December. What do you think of the new College and its programme? As emphasised in press comments, Ursula von der Leyen has redefined her role in a radical way.The 'presidential' nature of the Commission President, from the original primus inter pares, emerged after the eastward enlargement of 2004-06, which increased the number of Commissioners to 28 (27 after Brexit). However, the degree of centralisation reached a new level in the formation of the 2024-29 College of Commissioners. The complexity of the 'lines of command' between Commissioners and Executive Vice-Presidents means that all decisions will end up on the President's desk already at the planning and drafting stage.

Ursula von der Leyen's power was clearly shown in the replacement of the French Commissioner, Thierry Breton, who was reappointed by President Macron in July, in the days leading up to the presentation of the new College. In his resignation letter, Breton indicated that the Commission President had asked Macron to name a new Commissioner against the promise of a more powerful portfolio. However, the new French commissioner, Stéphane Séjourné, a close associate of President Macron and former foreign minister, ended up with a considerably reduced portfolio compared to the one Breton had during the 2019-24 Commission: only one directorate-general will depend on Séjournée (single market), against the three (single market, digital, defence) that were under Breton's control.

In the current desert of political leadership in the EU, such a powerful and visible role of the Commission President is, however, no guarantee that the EU agenda will have a better chance of being realised. The reason lies in the weakness of national political leaders. Again in the past, important steps forward were taken when leading countries were led by strong pro-European leaders: Kohl and Mitterrand working with Delors to launch the single market and the euro in the 1980s and, closer to home, Macron (during his first term) and Merkel joining forces with von der Leyen in launching Next Generation EU. Invariably, however, when short-term domestic concerns took over from European objectives, stagnation followed.

Mario Draghi's report on EU competitiveness has the ambition to provide the blueprint for the new Commission. The risk, however, is a Draghi à la carte, where only what is politically easier is retained. In fact, the most innovative element of the Draghi report is its internal coherence: by bringing together rigorous analysis and regulatory, budgetary and governance measures, the report defines the challenges that the EU has to face in order to avoid long agony. Of course, it does not represent a take-it-or-leave-it agenda. However, it would be a mistake to question its integrity for reasons of domestic political expediency: regulation, finance and governance must be held together. In the past, the Commission has often tried to compensate for a lack of financial resources by focusing only on regulation: Draghi has shown the limits of such an approach.

With reference to European history, Draghi's report cannot be seen as the 1985 Delors-Cockfield White Paper that set the agenda for the completion of the single market by 1992. Nor should it suffer the fate of Delors' swan song, the 1994 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, which was hailed as a forward-looking plan, but turned out to be politically unachievable. The hearings in the European Parliament of the new Commissioners are the moment when the coherence and ambition of the new College's commitments to the Draghi agenda will be assessed.