Industrial policy

Industrial policy: it is not just ‘how much’ is spent that matters, but above all ‘how’

 (AdobeStock)

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

After decades of scepticism, industrial policy has returned to the centre of the economic debate. In Europe, the Draghi report on competitiveness has placed stagnating productivity and technological competition from the United States and China at the top of the agenda, identifying industrial policy as one of the levers for responding. The energy transition and the race for new technologies make it difficult to imagine that industrial development can be driven by the market alone. The most recent literature has recognised this: the key question is no longer whether to intervene, but how to do so (Juhász et al., 2024).

Among the tools of industrial policy, subsidies are by far the most widely used in the major economies: tax credits, subsidised loans, guarantees and direct transfers. Italia is no exception. According to European Commission data compiled by the Observatory on Italian Public Accounts, in 2024 Italian state aid, in various forms, amounted to €18.3 billion, approximately 0.8 per cent of GDP. More striking than the volume is the breakdown: 37.5 per cent went towards measures to tackle the crisis, compared with less than 10 per cent on average across Europe, and only 13 per cent towards environmental objectives, compared with 41 per cent at European level. Tax relief is the largest item, and the stock of public guarantees – at almost 15 per cent of GDP – is among the highest in the EU.

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It is therefore essential to evaluate these instruments, both because they commit substantial resources and because their design can make the difference between a subsidy that transforms the productive structure and one that freezes it in place. A simple but useful distinction is that between generalised subsidies, available to all firms in a sector, and subsidies targeted at individual firms deemed strategic for steering industrial development. In public debate, and often amongst competition authorities too, the former are seen as neutral, whilst the latter are viewed as distorting and anti-competitive. Empirical evidence suggests a more nuanced picture.

In a recent study (Belloc and Lofaro, 2026a) we cross-referenced over 30,000 subsidy measures recorded by Global Trade Alert with the financial statements of around 1.2 million manufacturing firms in 121 countries, between 2012 and 2019. When subsidies are widespread (‘blanket subsidies’), the subsidised sectors see a significant increase in the rate at which new firms enter the market. However, the firms attracted are, on average, less productive: at the end of their first year of operation, their total factor productivity is 5.5 per cent lower than that of new firms in unsubsidised sectors, and this gap persists in subsequent years. Furthermore, following the introduction of a subsidy, the proportion of ‘empty’ firms – those with no employees or no revenue in their first three years of operation – rises from 3.2 per cent to 4.3 per cent: an indication that some new firms enter the market to claim public benefits rather than to produce.

However, the average figure masks significant differences between the various instruments. It is primarily tax relief and unconditional loans that generate the negative effect, with a productivity gap of almost 11 per cent. Conversely, measures to promote exports and those aimed at investment by small and medium-sized enterprises attract more productive firms, by 11.8 per cent and 18.2 per cent respectively. Subsidies for the adoption of green technologies and automation do not show any systematic negative effects. In summary, measures that ease budgetary constraints without requiring anything in return lower the barrier to market entry; those linked to a specific objective tend to promote better-performing firms.

However, it is also important to consider the subsidies directed at individual strategic firms, which over the last decade have accounted for over 60 per cent of the new initiatives recorded. These are, by definition, asymmetric public interventions (they benefit specific firms), and are therefore viewed with scepticism, particularly due to their potential negative effects on market structure, in the form of increased concentration. However, out of around 10,000 measures of this kind, in Europe as well as in North America, in Japan and South Korea as well as in China, the average effect on market concentration, measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is essentially zero (Belloc and Lofaro, 2026b). On the one hand, concentration increases amongst firms already present at the time of public intervention, because the target firm takes market share away from its competitors. On the other hand, however, the market expands: demand and the number of active firms grow, and the sector as a whole gains weight in the national economy. The two effects almost exactly cancel each other out. ‘Blanket’ subsidies, on the other hand, attract new firms but do not lead to an expansion of either demand or the market as a whole.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this evidence. The first is that the choice between public intervention and no intervention is misguided: what matters is the design of the instruments. Tax relief and guarantees distributed without conditions, which place a heavy burden on public expenditure, are largely ineffective in promoting an increase in business productivity. The second is that support for strategic firms should not be demonised, as it can help steer industrial development in a way that is conducive to growth. The third concerns evaluation: conditional, temporary measures that are assessed retrospectively are the only way to distinguish useful subsidies from those that merely transfer economic rents.

For Italia, and for Europe, the stakes are high. With labour productivity having grown by just a few tenths of a percentage point a year over the last thirty years and industrial output on the decline, there is a very real risk of losing our standing as an industrial power. We need more industrial policies, not fewer. But, above all, we need policies that are capable of making choices.


* (University of Siena) and Antonino Lofaro (University of Bari)

 

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Bibliography

Belloc, F., & Lofaro, A. (2026a). Subsidies, new firms, and productivity in global manufacturing. International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 104, 103238.

Belloc, F., & Lofaro, A. (2026b). Corporate subsidies and market structure. SSRN Working Paper 7666538.

Juhász, R., Lane, N., & Rodrik, D. (2024). The new economics of industrial policy. Annual Review of Economics, 16, 213–242.

 

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