Industrial policy: it is not just ‘how much’ is spent that matters, but above all ‘how’
After decades of scepticism, industrial policy has returned to the centre of the economic debate. In Europe, the Draghi report on competitiveness has placed stagnating productivity and technological competition from the United States and China at the top of the agenda, identifying industrial policy as one of the levers for responding. The energy transition and the race for new technologies make it difficult to imagine that industrial development can be driven by the market alone. The most recent literature has recognised this: the key question is no longer whether to intervene, but how to do so (Juhász et al., 2024).
Among the tools of industrial policy, subsidies are by far the most widely used in the major economies: tax credits, subsidised loans, guarantees and direct transfers. Italia is no exception. According to European Commission data compiled by the Observatory on Italian Public Accounts, in 2024 Italian state aid, in various forms, amounted to €18.3 billion, approximately 0.8 per cent of GDP. More striking than the volume is the breakdown: 37.5 per cent went towards measures to tackle the crisis, compared with less than 10 per cent on average across Europe, and only 13 per cent towards environmental objectives, compared with 41 per cent at European level. Tax relief is the largest item, and the stock of public guarantees – at almost 15 per cent of GDP – is among the highest in the EU.
It is therefore essential to evaluate these instruments, both because they commit substantial resources and because their design can make the difference between a subsidy that transforms the productive structure and one that freezes it in place. A simple but useful distinction is that between generalised subsidies, available to all firms in a sector, and subsidies targeted at individual firms deemed strategic for steering industrial development. In public debate, and often amongst competition authorities too, the former are seen as neutral, whilst the latter are viewed as distorting and anti-competitive. Empirical evidence suggests a more nuanced picture.
In a recent study (Belloc and Lofaro, 2026a) we cross-referenced over 30,000 subsidy measures recorded by Global Trade Alert with the financial statements of around 1.2 million manufacturing firms in 121 countries, between 2012 and 2019. When subsidies are widespread (‘blanket subsidies’), the subsidised sectors see a significant increase in the rate at which new firms enter the market. However, the firms attracted are, on average, less productive: at the end of their first year of operation, their total factor productivity is 5.5 per cent lower than that of new firms in unsubsidised sectors, and this gap persists in subsequent years. Furthermore, following the introduction of a subsidy, the proportion of ‘empty’ firms – those with no employees or no revenue in their first three years of operation – rises from 3.2 per cent to 4.3 per cent: an indication that some new firms enter the market to claim public benefits rather than to produce.
However, the average figure masks significant differences between the various instruments. It is primarily tax relief and unconditional loans that generate the negative effect, with a productivity gap of almost 11 per cent. Conversely, measures to promote exports and those aimed at investment by small and medium-sized enterprises attract more productive firms, by 11.8 per cent and 18.2 per cent respectively. Subsidies for the adoption of green technologies and automation do not show any systematic negative effects. In summary, measures that ease budgetary constraints without requiring anything in return lower the barrier to market entry; those linked to a specific objective tend to promote better-performing firms.

