Where does the dollar go? The unilateralism of US policy
Trump has stated that he is no longer willing to pay the costs of offering a public good such as the dollar as a reserve currency, although he does not wish to give up the privileges it entails
4' min read
4' min read
Our Dollar, Your Problem is the title of the latest book by Kenneth Rogoff, professor at Harvard University and former IMF chief economist. The phrase was uttered in 1971 by John Connally, Secretary of the Treasury under the Nixon administration, during a meeting with some European leaders who were irritated by the American decision to suspend the dollar's convertibility to gold, impose tariffs on imports and let the US currency devalue.
With cynicism, Connally summarised the unilateralism of American economic policy, aimed at protecting its own economy regardless of the negative effects on other countries. It was a key moment of the 'Nixon Shock', when the president effectively announced the end of the international monetary system designed at Bretton Woods in 1944.
In those years, as today, the United States had a large trade deficit, which was counterbalanced by a massive accumulation of financial assets in dollars by central banks and the private sector of other countries. These assets could not be converted into gold, as predicted by Robert Triffin in his famous dilemma, which highlighted the difficulty of the global reserve currency in providing ample liquidity while ensuring confidence.
However, the US currency, after a period of turbulence, did not lose its centrality, as many economists, including Charles Kindleberger, had predicted. Thanks to the strength of its institutions, the regained independence of the Fed, the presence of liquid and deep financial markets, and the solidity of its economy and military apparatus, the dollar remained the 'anchor' for many countries, the main reserve, invoicing and financing currency for international trade. Network economies - everyone uses it because everyone else does - further strengthened the position of the American currency, so much so that some economists spoke of a second Bretton Woods.
As Valéry Giscard d'Estaing first pointed out, this gave the United States 'enormous privileges', as it allowed them to borrow at low interest rates, run huge and persistent trade deficits, and issue vast amounts of currency and government bonds ($36 trillion!) to finance government deficits.

