Defence of the Future

5G is becoming a widespread radar system. The idea is to use it against drones

Ericsson is working on using radio wave reflections to track unmanned aircraft. For governments, the prospect is appealing: using infrastructure already in place across the country to step up surveillance of airports, ports, power stations and military installations. But the current network is for civilian use

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6' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

6' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

Ericsson is working on a new application for mobile networks. 5G antennas, as well as transmitting communications, can help to detect and track drones by utilising radio wave reflections, even when the drones are not connected to the network. The company claims to have detected small aircraft at distances of several kilometres and anticipates pilot projects as early as 2027, with wider-scale roll-out from 2028. For governments, the prospect is appealing: using infrastructure already in place across the country to step up surveillance of airports, ports, power stations and military installations. But this is where the political and industrial problem arises, because the networks are owned or operated by civilian operators. Whilst this new function would be of value to national security, its reliability, effective coverage, costs and operational responsibilities have not yet been subject to independent public validation on a national scale.

What is ISAC

The principle of Integrated Sensing and Communication, or ISAC , involves using radio wave reflections to gather information on the presence and movement of objects. With multiple observation points, trajectories can be constructed even without receiving messages from the drone. Not every antenna, however, automatically becomes a radar: compatible equipment, favourable geometry, synchronisation and computing power are required. And detecting an object is not the same as recognising it, classifying it correctly or determining whether it is authorised to fly.

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The 2026 trials distinguish between what is possible and what remains to be proven. In February, at its US headquarters in Plano, Ericsson demonstrated the detection of passive objects using massive-MIMO equipment. In July, working with AT&T outside AT&T Stadium in Arlington, it tracked several drones flying at altitudes of between 300 and 400 feet – approximately 91–122 metres – using several synchronised radio sites. In September, in collaboration with Erillisverkot, the Finnish network operator for public authorities, it conducted trials in Helsinki and at the port of Vuosaari. In October, in Kraków, it integrated radio sensing with acoustic sensors and Asseco’s PUSZCZYK platform.

False alarms and lost tracks shift the cost of uncertainty onto security personnel. Radar, thermal cameras and acoustic sensors produce different types of information, and the value of ISAC lies in adding distributed observations to them, not in replacing them. The Polish trial combined radio, acoustic and software data, but viewing the signals together does not prove that they are correctly associated with the same target. Artificial intelligence can help, provided that its classifications are based on verifiable measurements: decisions still rest with the competent authorities.

The economic issue

The business model introduces a second misunderstanding. Play, the Polish partner, reported over 13,500 radio stations and more than 13.5 million mobile subscribers. These are significant figures for data transmission, but they do not measure the area that can be covered by the new system. In the trial in Kraków, the sensing system used the industrial spectrum, whilst Play’s 5G network provided the transport link. A commercial network can therefore contribute to the service without all its antennas detecting drones.

Ericsson aims to reuse existing masts, equipment, connections and frequencies, but the project’s cost-effectiveness will depend on regulatory and technical changes: the replacement of incompatible radio units, edge computing, energy consumption, maintenance, cyber security and certification. Scaling up the network’s capacity to accommodate an assumed average sensing range would yield neither credible coverage nor a reliable cost estimate.

Ericsson is planning pilot projects dedicated to sensing . Entirely reconfigured networks are another matter altogether. For an operator, the new service opens up a market, but a decision must be made as to who will guarantee the measurements, safeguard the data and be responsible for faults. A public authority could receive coordinates without controlling the nodes that generate them, whilst those same connections support essential public services. The distribution of sites does not eliminate the common faults associated with management, synchronisation, transmission and computation.

6G won’t untangle the knot

The move towards 6G does not automatically resolve the issue. The International Telecommunication Union included sensing amongst the six use cases for IMT-2030 in November 2023. The 3GPP developed the requirements for this in Release 19 and is continuing its radio studies in Release 20, whilst Release 21 contains specifications that are still under development. In February 2026, ETSI identified seventeen architectural issues; in March, it highlighted nineteen issues relating to security, privacy and sustainability, fifteen of which concerned security and confidentiality; on 5 November, it announced five challenges and six possible solutions for integrating computing and sensing. 6G will be able to coordinate multiple sites, but higher frequencies and denser networks do not guarantee greater coverage: obstacles, attenuation and geometric limitations remain.

The European context

The NIS2 Directive of 2022 sets out the cybersecurity obligations for entities falling within its scope, including electronic communications activities; the Directive on the resilience of critical infrastructure imposes a further set of responsibilities in the sectors concerned. The European Electronic Communications Code regulates key aspects of networks and spectrum, whilst data protection legislation comes into play when the information collected is of a personal nature.

None of these provisions, taken in isolation, authorises blanket surveillance. This distinction will have an impact on tenders: a technically functional product may remain unusable for a specific purpose if it is unclear which authority activates it, how observations are handled, and the conditions under which the security forces may access it.

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In Italia, Legislative Decree 138 of 4 September 2024, which came into force on 16 October, transposed NIS2, assigning the powers provided for by the legislation to the National Cybersecurity Agency. However, the potential deployment of commercial antennas around airports, ports and energy infrastructure cannot be resolved by an IT decision alone. The relationship between the network owner, the authority responsible for security, the data provider and the institution authorised to act must be defined. Italian industry could participate in the integration of platforms and components, but the dossier does not document a national ISAC programme that has already been commissioned. For public decision-makers, the risk would be to finance the geographical expansion of a service before knowing which part of the network is actually convertible and how much it would cost to keep it operational.

In France, the restrictions also apply to frequencies. In July 2026, Arcep updated the operators’ spectrum allocations, including those in the 3.4–3.8 GHz band: these are rights for mobile communications that must not be confused with blanket authorisations for any form of sensing. The CNIL, in its June 2025 guidelines on cameras mounted on drones for public safety, demonstrates just how specific the legal basis for surveillance technology must be. Drone-mounted cameras are not ISAC antennas, but the merging of radio data with identifiable images can alter the legal regime governing the information processed. Paris therefore has an institutional framework capable of supporting targeted assessments, without this implying that a nationwide deployment has already taken place.

In Germany, the legislation implementing NIS2 came into force on 6 December 2025. For a production system that relies on reliable networks and infrastructure, introducing new monitoring functions entails an additional risk assessment: software, access, maintenance and interfaces must not compromise the services that the company is already required to protect. The cost-effectiveness will vary between a facility with compatible radio sites and an area requiring new equipment. Here too, the maturity of the 5G network does not, in itself, demonstrate the maturity of the monitoring system.

The United Kingdom has a more visible public demand. In 2026, the Ministry of Defence earmarked over 200 million pounds for systems to counter unmanned aerial vehicles; in September, the Project PANOPTES programme made £5 million immediately available for integrated innovations in force protection. These funds are not earmarked for Ericsson: they indicate that London is funding the operational challenge to which mobile sensing could also contribute. British initiatives to counter fibre-optic-controlled drones highlight the limitations of systems that rely on intercepting the target’s radio transmissions. Methods based on reflections can provide an additional means of observation, but they still need to be assessed against the client’s specific requirements.

Alliances and physical limitations

For NATO and the European Union, the common interest does not eliminate national fragmentation. Data provided by a civilian network must reach command systems with verifiable information on its origin, date and accuracy, because a shared screen does not guarantee a reliable operational picture. Nor does 6G resolve the physical difficulty of observing underwater or underground: specialised acoustic and geological instruments will be required, with data correlated via networks rather than generated by mobile antennas.

Charlye Ghezzi is a geopolitical analyst and specialist in technology and government security

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