6G is quietly making headway – the telecommunications network that sees

6G will not simply be a faster network. It will be the first infrastructure in which telecommunications, artificial intelligence, the cloud, sensing capabilities and satellites can operate as a single system. It will determine which factories operate in real time, which ports manage automated traffic, which public services remain operational during a crisis, and who controls the data produced by critical infrastructure. For Europe, therefore, the challenge is not simply to launch a new mobile standard, but to seek to free its industrial future from technological dependence. And for Italia, this means choosing whether to become one of the strategic hubs of the new Euro-Mediterranean network or, once again, to limit itself to purchasing technologies, licences and computing power designed elsewhere. The most misleading definition of 6G is also the most widespread: the evolution of 5G. In reality, the European Commission expects the first implementations to begin around 2030, but describes a much more profound break with the past than a mere increase in performance. The future system will integrate connectivity, distributed computing, artificial intelligence, localisation, sensing and non-terrestrial links. A network, therefore, capable not only of transmitting information, but also of interpreting the environment, distributing computing power and autonomously reconfiguring services. A network capable of locating objects, recognising anomalies and directing machines is no longer a neutral piece of infrastructure. It becomes part of the decision-making chain of a factory, a port, an electricity grid, a hospital, a logistics system or a military facility.

Europe may have realised what is at stake before the market matures. Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 established the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking, entrusting it with the explicit task of strengthening European technological sovereignty in 6G. The Union’s contribution may reach 900 million euros over the period 2021–2027; private members must mobilise resources of at least the same amount. On 11 April 2025, the Joint Undertaking’s Governing Board approved an amended programme allocating 104 million to the fourth call for proposals. The first three calls had already selected 80 projects and committed over 500 million. On 18 December 2025, the 2026–2027 work programme was adopted; on 2 March 2026, the Commission announced a further 116 million for 20 projects. These are significant figures, but they do not yet constitute a power policy. The outcome will not be measured by the number of consortia funded, but by the intellectual property transformed into products. For 6G, the key date to mark in the calendar is 2030. Once essential architectures, interfaces and patents have been incorporated into the standards, many dependencies will become costly to eliminate. The real window for decision-making is therefore the present: not the moment when the networks go live, but the moment when it is decided how they are to operate.

Europe is not starting out unarmed. It has two global manufacturers of mobile infrastructure, Nokia and Ericsson; major operators such as Deutsche Telekom, Orange, Telefónica and TIM; research centres such as imec, CEA-Leti and VTT; a space industry built around Airbus, Thales Alenia Space, OHB, Telespazio and continental satellite operators. The Hexa-X-II project, coordinated by Nokia Solutions and Networks, demonstrates this strength. The CORDIS programme 101095759 brings together 45 participants to develop a 6G architecture capable of integrating communications, sensing, computing and reliable artificial intelligence. Italia is participating through TIM, Nextworks and the National Inter-University Consortium for Telecommunications. The value will be distributed across at least five levels: semiconductors and radio components; access equipment; network software; cloud and edge computing; and artificial intelligence for orchestration. To these will be added space. Being strong in two segments whilst dependent in the others may mean owning the visible network without controlling its ‘brain’. For Nokia and Ericsson, 6G is therefore a battle to preserve Europe’s central role. For operators, it is a different battle: preventing the bulk of the value from migrating to cloud providers, software platforms and satellite capacity providers. Finally, for governments, the issue is to prevent commercial dependence from becoming a political vulnerability.

On 12 February 2025, the Commission’s Radio Spectrum Policy Group adopted report RSPG25-006 on the strategic vision for 6G, identifying spectrum readiness as a prerequisite for the launch of services from 2030. This was followed on 16 June 2026 by Opinion RSPG26-013 on the European roadmap. Behind the technical jargon lies a crucial economic choice. If Member States proceed with divergent timetables, conditions and authorisations, Europe will offer manufacturers a fragmented market. If, on the other hand, they coordinate spectrum allocation before the commercial phase, they will be able to create a continental scale sufficient to support European equipment, terminals and services. The lesson from 5G is clear: the allocation of frequencies cannot be treated merely as an opportunity for public revenue. High licence fees divert capital away from investment; rigid licensing regimes can hinder industrial networks and experimentation; and disjointed national policies reduce Europe’s ability to influence international standards. In 6G, spectrum policy and industrial policy should go hand in hand.

The most radical change will come from the integration of terrestrial and non-terrestrial networks. A mobile phone, vehicle, ship or industrial sensor will no longer need to ‘know’ whether the connection is via a terrestrial antenna or a satellite. The network will choose the route based on coverage, security, latency and resilience. Europe is developing its own framework through IRIS 2, established by Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of 15 March 2023. On 16 December 2024, the Commission signed a 12-year concession agreement with SpaceRISE, a consortium comprising SES, Eutelsat and Hispasat. The architecture currently outlined by the Commission comprises 348 satellites in low and medium Earth orbit, with government and commercial services expected by 2030. A document from the Council of the European Union dated 17 July 2025 put the programme’s cost at approximately €10.6 billion: €2.4 billion from the EU budget, €685 million from the European Space Agency and the remainder from private capital. The core group of subcontractors includes Thales Alenia Space, OHB, Airbus Defence and Space, Telespazio, Deutsche Telekom and Orange. IRIS 2 should not be seen as Europe’s response to a foreign commercial constellation. It is the potential public infrastructure for continental digital sovereignty: secure communications for institutions, crisis management, border surveillance, protection of critical infrastructure and coverage of areas lacking reliable terrestrial networks. Its value, however, will depend on integration with 6G. If satellites and the mobile network are built as separate ecosystems, Europe will end up with two costly infrastructures. If they share identity, security, orchestration and services, a truly continental network may emerge, resilient to the disruption of individual terrestrial segments.