A ‘grey area’ scenario awaits us in Hormuz

The new alliance between Iran and Oman over the Strait of Hormuz should not be seen as a diplomatic announcement in a highly tense region, but as an attempt to use administrative means to reshape the balance of power in one of the world’s most sensitive maritime channels. The key question is whether Tehran will succeed in turning security management into a tool for exerting political and economic pressure on international shipping, without explicitly violating the law of the sea and without openly declaring an illegal closure of the strait. On the one hand, there is a genuine need for coordination amongst the coastal states: the Strait of Hormuz is an energy bottleneck, a corridor of the highest strategic importance, a lifeline where military risks, incidents, hybrid threats and global commercial interests converge. On the other hand, it is precisely this need for management that can become the gateway through which a more ambiguous notion of sovereignty is introduced: no longer the closure of the strait – which would be difficult to justify on the international stage – but an accumulation of procedures, checks, requests for information, service charges, selective delays and insurance-related pressures capable of making passage more costly, more opaque and more susceptible to manipulation. The legal boundary, at least on paper, is clear. Iran and Oman can coordinate security, report hazards, work on traffic lanes and separation systems, and prevent accidents and pollution. They cannot, however, transform these prerogatives into a discretionary system of authorisations, a disguised toll or a discriminatory mechanism for access. And this is where the real battle lies: not between openness and closure, but between technical management and political control. The international regime governing straits used for international navigation safeguards the right of transit and does not allow coastal states to suspend it, obstruct it or subject it to arbitrary restrictions.

Muscat appears to be the partner capable of providing diplomatic cover for dialogue with Tehran without necessarily legitimising a shift towards coercion. Over the next five years, it can present the joint committee as an instrument of stabilisation and mediation, anchoring it in the security of navigation and a shared responsibility towards the international community. In the coming years, much of the balance will depend on Oman’s ability to keep the process within a technical framework, preventing ‘services’ and ‘costs’ from becoming synonymous with control over the right of passage. The stakes, after all, extend far beyond the naval sphere. Hormuz is not merely a matter of fleets and deterrence: it is a risk multiplier for energy markets, for marine insurance, for liquefied natural gas routes, for the security of Asian refineries and for the cost of European imports.

Although other players in the region, starting with Saudi Arabia, are exploring and launching alternative energy routes, it will take years to reduce the importance of the Strait of Hormuz and cut the volume of crude oil transiting through it. Abu Dhabi has launched its own overland route to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the strait. Riyadh has brought its pipeline to the Red Sea into operation. But at present, this is not enough. Thus, even in the absence of a formal closure, all Iran needs to do is increase operational friction to produce global economic effects. If transit remains theoretically open but becomes less transparent, more expensive and more uncertain, the impact is immediately felt in freight rates, war premiums, logistics planning and energy prices. In this sense, the deterioration in the reliability of AIS signals – those used to track ships’ movements – is a telling indicator. When visibility of traffic in such a sensitive waterway declines, the vulnerability of all parties involved increases: shipowners, insurers, importers, governments and financial operators.

The most likely scenario is not that of a closed strait, but one of continuous, gradual and legally ambiguous administrative pressure. A situation in which freedom of navigation is not openly denied, but subject to a series of conditions and obstacles that undermine its practical value. It is a more sophisticated strategy than a pure military threat, because it allows Tehran to build up leverage without immediately crossing the threshold of a direct breach of international law. The conclusion is that the battle over Hormuz, in the coming years, will be fought less on the basis of geography than on the definition of what constitutes ‘security’ and what constitutes ‘control’. Iran has an enormous advantage. Without any military action, it could increase the perceived costs of transit, introduce legal and insurance uncertainty, and prompt operators, importers and governments to react pre-emptively. Finally, it could present all these measures as routine coastal security operations. If, on the other hand, ‘security’ becomes the predominant terminology, then the strait will remain open on paper, but politically constrained. And it is precisely in this gap between formal legality and concrete effects that the true novelty of the Hormuz issue is measured today.