Is the penalty more severe if the victim is a woman? The Constitutional Court will decide
The focus is on the aggravating circumstance introduced for the offence of domestic abuse
Key points
The law on femicide, No. 181 of 2025, ends up before the Constitutional Court. The Court of Modena has in fact raised the question of constitutionality regarding the aggravating circumstance , increasing the sentence by one-third to one-half, where the offence of domestic abuse has been committed against a woman as the victim, as an act of discrimination or abuse of power, or as an act of control, possession or domination ‘by virtue of her being a woman’.
Men are victims too
As regards the order for referral, there are in fact no logical obstacles ‘to the possibility that an offence of ill-treatment, characterised by one of the elements specified in the aggravating circumstance in question, may be committed not only by a man against a woman, also by a woman against a man (further issues raised by the different scenario of an offence committed by a woman against another woman, or by a man against another man, or against transgender people will be discussed below): none of the acts described in Article 572, paragraph 5, of the Criminal Code is inextricably linked, on naturalistic groundsto the specific sex of the victim’.
The legislator’s choice
Thus, if the legislator, in the case of identical conduct, punishes an attack on the same legal interest differently depending on the sex of the victim, the consequence is that the legal system introduces a higher level of protection for the same legal interest based on the sex of its holder.
The law imposes harsher penalties for the control, domination or suppression of personal autonomy or the restriction of an individual’s personal freedoms only to the extent that these ‘form part of a normative narrative of gender conflict’. The same behaviour, if devoid of such a cultural label, remains less serious from a criminal law perspective’.
Criminal policy
The aggravating circumstance, therefore, does not identify a fact indicative of greater criminal culpability, but rather, as the order observes, uses the reference to ‘woman’ as a normative catalyst for a systemic culpability, which is then projected onto the individual perpetrator. The consequence is that the perpetrator ends up bearing, in the sentence imposed on him, not so much the condemnation for what he actually did, ‘but also a broader aim of symbolic and general opposition to a specific form of criminal behaviour’.


