Assaults on doctors and nurses, still vague protections require clear stakes from health care companies

The rule that assumes patronage in the event of assaults is present only in the three collective agreements of the health sector and in that of the local functions sector: the first time in Article 55 of the Ccnl of the sector of 27 October 2025 and, subsequently, in Articles 14 and 10 of the two Preintese of the executive areas, respectively of 11 and 18 November.

This is a completely innovative rule dictated, as is evident, by the increasingly frequent and unrelenting incidents of violence. The clause is rather general and has gaps that must be filled by the company regulation. The first paragraph is purely mannerist and merely repeats what many legislative provisions and Article 2087 of the Civil Code itself state. The remaining four paragraphs can be distinguished by reason of the verb used: in paragraphs 2 and 4 the present indicative tense is used, so that the burdens of defence and psychological support are subjective rights of the employee and contractual obligations of the company; in paragraphs 3 and 5 the verb 'may' is present, with the consequence that the establishment of a civil party and insurance cover are options for the company.

One aspect of the clause that does not appear very clear is in the title itself, namely the meaning of the term 'aggression' and whether or not it also includes verbal aggression. To delve into the issue let us start from the law itself: Article 7 of Law 113/2020 refers to 'episodes of aggression or violence', thus a more articulated concept than that of the contract. The aforementioned law, in any case, privileged 'physicality', because Article 4 in establishing the aggravating circumstances refers to the crime of grievous or very grievous bodily harm pursuant to Article 583-quater; but the subsequent Article 5 includes among the aggravating circumstances of Article 61 the act of 'violence or threat'.
The Treccani defines the lemma aggression as follows: 'Violent action of one or more persons against other persons, which may contain the constituent elements of various criminal offences, depending on the manner and means by which it is exercised, the event that occurs or the end to which it is directed (murder, bodily harm, battery, private violence, robbery, threats, etc.). It is a term from everyday, non-legal language, also used in a broader sense to indicate acts generally carried out in a spirit of aggression, of oppression'.

Symptomatic is that reference to 'everyday language' that should never be used in a regulatory text, since precise rights and obligations are at stake. I do not think this aspect should be underestimated because, often, assaults on doctors, nurses and OSS are also very violent, but verbal. In conclusion, it must be ruled out that the contractual rule intended to limit advocacy only to physical violence, and a different reading would constitute a deviation from the path that has been painstakingly pursued for five years with unfortunately few concrete results. Just for the sake of precision and in the light of the semantic value of the term 'assault', the above-mentioned doubts could arise in relation to certain offences, for example, of Insulting a public official (341-bis cp), Defamation (595 cp), Private violence (610 cp), Threats (612 cp), Persecutory acts (612-bis cp).

The two specific contractual provisions have a distinct nature: one, already present in the previous contracts, assumes 'passive' advocacy while the new one assumes 'active' advocacy. Compared to Art. 54, which intervenes in the defence phase, in the strict sense, of the employee, Art. 55 has a broader scope, as it is also applicable in the phase of 'activation' of judicial, criminal or civil proceedings, following an episode of aggression by a third party.