Beijing’s fighter jets soar over the skies of Egypt: a show of Chinese strength against Paris (and the EU)

Conversely, the Rafale compensates for its more compact antenna surface area with a reduced radar cross-section (RCS), the incorporation of radar-absorbing materials, and the sophisticated self-protection and electronic warfare suite SPECTRA (Rafale Protection and Fire Control Evasion System). The presence in the area of operations of the Shaanxi Y-9LG long-range reconnaissance and jamming aircraft and the KJ-500A radar node enabled technicians from the PLAAF to observe the behaviour of Western electromagnetic emissions under realistic conditions.

Although Egyptian rules of engagement protect the proprietary algorithms and cryptographic keys of mission computers, high-load-factor flight operations produce inevitable physical traces: pulse repetition frequencies, modulation patterns, frequency hopping and the thermal behaviour of the Snecma M88-2 engines, as recorded by the Type 17 passive electro-optical infrared sensor. This data feeds directly into threat libraries to optimise the countermeasure systems of China’s fifth-generation fighter aircraft.

For France, the deployment of the Rafale in joint exercises with the PLAAF raises questions of a strategic and industrial nature. Dassault Aviation, supported by system partners such as Thales and Safran, has turned the Rafale into one of Europe’s greatest commercial successes in the defence sector, with major contracts secured in Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Indonesia and India.

Safeguarding the confidentiality of the operational characteristics of the SPECTRA suite and the RBE2 AESA radar antenna is a national security priority for Paris. The French Ministry of Defence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are closely monitoring the development of Western weapon systems that are not subject to full NATO integration requirements.

The fact that Egypt is using the F3-R variant, which does not feature the MBDA Meteor long-range missile, highlights how the export restrictions imposed by Western governments are prompting buyer nations to explore the integration of advanced Chinese missiles, such as the PL-15E dual-pulse missile, thereby affecting the commercial competitiveness of the French aerospace consortium in non-aligned markets.

For Italia, developments in Sino-Egyptian manoeuvres directly affect the strategic direction of the wider Mediterranean – a vital area for national energy supplies, trade flows through the Suez Canal and the security of undersea telecommunications and energy infrastructure. Rome, which maintains strong industrial and naval cooperation ties with Cairo through the supply of naval vessels by Fincantieri and avionics systems by Leonardo, is seeing its southern maritime sector transformed into a transit and training area for the air forces of external global powers.

From a technological perspective, the capability demonstrated by Chinese aircraft to monitor the electromagnetic spectrum and operate in a network with AEW&C platforms is accelerating the need for the Italian Air Force to consolidate its intelligence superiority. This reinforces the integration of the Eurofighter Typhoon and F-35 Lightning II fleets with the Gulfstream G550 CAEW surveillance and electronic warfare aircraft, highlighting the need to protect data transmission channels and to develop cognitive jamming capabilities based on open and modular architectures.

In Germany, air operations in North Africa are fuelling debate over the Luftwaffe’s operational readiness and industrial sovereignty

European aerospace sector. Berlin, a major shareholder in Airbus Defence and Space and a partner in the Eurofighter programme, is watching with caution the convergence between China’s diplomatic outreach and the demand for military modernisation from countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Evidence that advanced fourth-generation aircraft are operating in conjunction with dedicated electronic warfare assets reinforces Germany’s conviction regarding the need to integrate swarms of remote carriers (Remote Carriers) and collaborative combat systems into the FCAS/SCAF (Future Combat Air System) programme, which is being carried out jointly with France and Spain.

However, disagreements between Paris and Berlin over operational requirements, the division of industrial work between Dassault and Airbus, and intellectual property rights are complicating the path towards a sixth-generation fighter, exposing the European industry to the risk of falling behind the rapid pace of development demonstrated by the Chinese industrial sector.

The United Kingdom views the PLAAF’s electromagnetic data collection activities through the prism of global security and interoperability with strategic partners. London views with concern the implications for the Indian Air Force, a key partner in the UK’s Indo-Pacific strategy: Beijing’s understanding of the Rafale’s radar and thermal signatures reduces New Delhi’s tactical advantage.

For the British Government and BAE Systems, the answer lies in pressing ahead without hesitation with the trilateral GCAP programme (Global Combat Air Programme), developed in collaboration with Italia and Japan. With binding industrial contracts already signed for the development phase, the GCAP consortium aims to integrate advanced multi-domain detection capabilities, software-defined radar systems with distributed computing power, and high-thermal-efficiency engines developed by Rolls-Royce, IHI and Avio Aero. The aim is to overcome the vulnerabilities of traditional sensor technology by creating a platform capable of operating in saturated and hostile electromagnetic environments.

Joint military exercises act as a catalyst for the commercial expansion of Beijing’s defence industry into the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East. Countries such as Egypt, burdened by budgetary constraints and bound by the political conditions attached to Western arms sales, find in China’s offerings technologically mature alternatives that come with no conditions regarding their operational use.

The availability of multi-role fighters such as the Chengdu J-10CE or the future Shenyang J-35/FC-31, backed by flexible payment arrangements and offset agreements, risks eroding market shares that have historically been the preserve of European and US industries.

For Europe, China’s military presence on the continent’s doorstep is not an isolated incident, but rather the tangible manifestation of an integrated global strategy. The convergence of military cooperation, infrastructure investment and the supply of advanced weapon systems is redefining the security landscape of the Euro-Mediterranean region.

Decision-makers in Rome, Paris, Berlin and London are faced with the need to preserve their strategic autonomy and industrial competitiveness, whilst accelerating the integration of defence capabilities and protecting critical domains of the electromagnetic spectrum and shared airspace.