Electoral reform/interview

Calderisi: 'The ballot? Impossible with equal bicameralism"

The electoral systems expert warns: 'There would be a risk of different outcomes in the two chambers. A single vote would be needed to make the double round envisaged if no one reaches 40 per cent, but this would require a constitutional norm'

by Emilia Patta

Giuseppe Calderisi, politico (Imagoeconomica)

3' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

3' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

"I am personally very much in favour of a ballot because, since 50 per cent is needed to win, it would make the 'middle voters' decisive and thus deradicalise the political system. But a system based on a national ballot with equal bicameralism unfortunately cannot be done: there would be a risk of different outcomes in the two chambers'.

Giuseppe Calderisi has been a member of parliament for a long time (first with the Radicals and then with Forza Italia and the Popolo delle libertà) and is considered one of the leading experts of the liberal area on institutional regulations and electoral systems. A convinced majoritarian, he has always been in favour of a system that favours a certain result and therefore governability. With him, we examine the electoral reform proposal that has been presented by the centre-right in Parliament and is about to be filed in the Chamber's Constitutional Affairs Committee: away with the constituencies of the current Rosatellum (37% of the total); proportional with a 3% barrier threshold and with a majority prize for the list or coalition that exceeds 40% of the votes; allocation of the prize through fixed lists of 70 deputies and 35 senators up to a ceiling of 230 deputies and 114 senators; provision for a runoff if the first two lists or coalitions do not reach 40% but both exceed 35%.

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To cut the bull's head off, Calderisi, couldn't the eventual ballot be held with a single vote for House and Senate?

No, a constitutional rule would be needed to decide the outcome for both chambers with one vote.

But after equalising the voter rolls, by extending the vote to 18-year-olds for the Senate as well, hasn't the risk of divergent results in the two chambers been zeroed out?

With two separate votes, there would always be a minimum proportion of voters who would differentiate their vote (because the candidates in the two chambers are different or for other reasons) and thus, yes, different outcomes in the two branches of parliament could be determined. Even a system with double-round uninominal constituencies might not yield a winner, but in that case voters are called upon to cast a second vote to decide on the allocation of individual uninominal constituencies anyway. In the case of the national ballot, on the other hand, the voters are called to the polls a second time precisely to decide the winner at the national level, but if two different winners emerge in the two chambers that vote would be completely useless. The system would be completely unreasonable with serious consequences also for abstentionism, which would grow disproportionately.

So in his opinion the ballot cannot be provided for in any case with the Constitution unchanged.

Absolutely not. Therefore, let us stop arguing about a ballot that is impossible under the current Constitution and instead insert a clause excluding the awarding of the prize in the case of two different winners in the two chambers. For the rest, the political world would do well to reflect seriously on the consequences of the failure to reform the parity bicameralism in order to arrive at shared constitutional changes at least to overcome its major faults (by introducing a rule allowing the ballot to be held with a single vote and perhaps providing for the confidence to be expressed by the Parliament in joint session).

Is the majority prize, on the other hand, compatible, with the correctives you suggest, with equal bicameralism?

Personally, I am more than in favour of the majority prize, because it is necessary to overcome the current law that would produce a tie and thus force wide-ranging or technocratic governments that no one wants, or to repeat elections several times. But the electoral law should be written respecting the rulings of the Constitutional Court, which has deemed admissible, for the list or coalition that exceeds 40% of the votes, a prize of up to 55% of the seats in order to favour governability. No further, approaching the guarantee quorum as the text presented by the centre-right does. In fact, it provides for a prize of up to 230 seats out of the 392 seats allocated in the constituencies of the national territory (8 seats are allocated in the Foreign Constituency). Therefore, the upper limit of seats, in percentage value, is 58.67%. Such a law would end up in front of the Constitutional Court in a few weeks with the very high risk (not to say certainty) of a ruling of unconstitutionality.

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