Atlantic Alliance

Defence spending, how much the debt increases if Italy opens up to the EU flexibility proposal

Economy Minister Giorgetti sent a clear message: 'Now we will not use the exemption from the Stability Pact to finance defence spending'.

Riarmo Ue, Giorgetti: fondi Difesa non a scapito Sanità e servizi

4' min read

4' min read

Europe is preparing for an unprecedented increase in defence spending, but Italy's high public debt has convinced the government to put the flexibility clause in the EU's ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan to increase defence spending, at least for now, in the drawer, in the wake of what the Trump administration is demanding from the US. Economy Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti spoke out loud. Speaking in parliament to illustrate the new public finance document, he sent out a clear message: this is not the time to talk about budget slippage, even if it is to cope with tariffs or to increase defence spending, which, moreover, will already reach 2% of GDP this year according to Nato commitments. "I have been asked whether the waiver to the Stability Pact will be used for military spending, my opinion," he said, "is that at this time the Italian government will not use it. We believe it is correct and fair to wait for the NATO summit in June 2025 to see the general orientation. And then calibrating military spending means making choices'.

'The deviation,' he added, 'I had it put in the Constitution, that possibility is due to me. But it must not be the easy solution. Before providing for additional expenditure, even for defence or duties, I want to know where that expenditure is going and why I have to make it. This is a criterion not of prudence or rigour, but of the good father of the family and it is the criterion with which as long as I remain minister I will continue to manage the Ministry of Economy and Finance'.

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According to Giorgetti, resorting to the EU loans of Safe ('Security and Action for Europe'), the new specific instrument for Security Action for Europe that will receive up to EUR 150 billion on the capital markets, using the consolidated unified funding approach to help EU member states rapidly and substantially increase investment in Europe's defence capabilities, 'is hardly attractive to anyone, so they will have to come up with something better in Europe'. In the prevailing uncertainty, the important thing, the minister made clear, is to maintain balance.

At the moment, Italy's target for 2025 is 1.57 per cent of GDP: 0.3 per cent more than in 2024, but still almost 10 billion away from the 2 per cent target. From 24 to 26 June, as anticipated by the minister, the heads of state and heads of government of the thirty-two members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation will meet in The Hague, and the threshold could be placed on 3.5 per cent. Meanwhile, Italy waits at the window.

UPB: defence clause delays exit from EU procedure

To understand what impact the decision to activate the safeguard clause granted by the EU to strengthen the defence sector could have for Italy, one need only look between the lines of the report presented by the UPB, the Parliamentary Budget Office, during its hearing on the Public Finance Document. The activation of the clause, in particular, could lead to a delay in Italy's exit from the excessive deficit procedure.

What this is about

The national escape clause allows Member States to exceed the net expenditure limits set by the European Council by up to 1.5 percentage points of gross domestic product per year in 2025-2028 if these are used to finance an increase in defence expenditure.

Where Italy starts

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Italy's defence spending currently stands at 1.2 per cent of GDP in 2023 according to the COFOG classification (the classification of public expenditure), and 1.5 per cent in 2024 according to that of the Atlantic Alliance, the Upb explains.

The scenario in case of partial utilisation of flexibility

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Simulations by the Parliamentary Budget Office estimate an increase in debt by 0.7 percentage points to 137.3 GDP in 2028 with a partial utilisation (0.25 percentage points of GDP in 2025 and 0.5 in 2026-28) of flexibility.

... and that in case the maximum permitted level is reached

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In contrast, with a gradual increase in expenditure up to the maximum allowed flexibility of 1.5 per cent in 2028, the debt would rise to 137.7 per cent and would lead to a worsening of the dynamics in the following years, with the debt/GDP ratio rising again after 2031. The positive economic impact of these expenditure increases depends on the composition of the expenditure and the degree to which domestic demand is activated, but the multiplier of these interventions is estimated to be less than one. After 2031, the gradual reduction in the cyclical component of the primary balance, due to the assumption of a closing output gap, and the increase in age-related expenditures, would lead to a gradual increase in the overall deficit, which would return to a stable level above the 3% threshold from 2034 onwards.

Bankitalia: Italy did not increase defence spending after Ukraine invasion

Andrea Brandolini, deputy head of the Department of Economics and Statistics at the Bank of Italy, explained, during his speech at the hearing on the Public Finance Document 2025 before the joint Budget Committees of the House and Senate, that 'defence spending as a ratio of GDP in Italy has gradually fallen since the years following the end of the Cold War and, according to the most recent NATO estimates (those of 17 June 2024, ed.), last year it stood at 1.5 per cent of GDP, below the 2 per cent level agreed in 2014 by the participants in the Atlantic Alliance. This trend,' he added, 'also affected the other major eurozone economies, which, however, increased spending, unlike Italy, after the invasion of Ukraine. In 2024, the share of EU NATO member countries with expenditure below the agreed minimum target fell to about one-third (from four-fifths in 2021)'.

"Rearmament left to individual countries without coordination can lead to inefficient spending"

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Bankitalia clarified that 'a rearmament effort entrusted to individual countries without coordination could in any case lead to inefficient (as it could not exploit possible economies of scale) and ineffective (due to the risk of both duplication and failure to make up for current shortfalls) spending. From the point of view of economic analysis, defence investment and spending have the nature of a European public good; a coordinated programme financed with common resources would make it easier to achieve an appropriate level and composition of overall spending'.

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